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International law’s traditional emphasis on state
practice has long been questioned, as scholars have
paid increasing attention to other important—though
sometimes inchoate—processes of international norm
development.  Yet, the more recent focus on
transnational law, governmental and non-
governmental networks, and judicial influence and
cooperation across borders, while a step in the right
direction, still seems insufficient to describe the
complexities of law in an era of globalization.
Accordingly, it is becoming clear that “international
law” is itself an overly constraining rubric and that we
need an expanded framework, one that situates cross-
border norm development at the intersection of legal
scholarship on comparative law, conflict of laws, civil
procedure, cyberlaw, and the cultural analysis of law,
as well as traditional international law.  Moreover,
this new scholarship must be truly interdisciplinary,
drawing on insights not only of international relations
theorists, but also of anthropologists, sociologists,
critical geographers, and cultural studies scholars.
Such insights afford a more nuanced idea of how
people actually form affiliations, construct
communities, and receive and develop legal norms,
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often with little regard for the fixed geographical
boundaries of the nation-state system.  This Article
refers to such a broader frame of analysis as “law and
globalization.”  Although “globalization” is, of
course, a controversial term, the idea of law and
globalization nevertheless provides a useful lens for
viewing the plural ways in which legal norms are
disseminated in the Twenty-first Century.  This Article
sketches the contours of what it might mean to
emphasize law and globalization, rather than simply
international law.  It suggests four important ways in
which the study of law and globalization enlarges the
traditional focus of international law and then
identifies ten areas of conceptual inquiry that are
already coalescing within the scholarly literature to
form the core of a study of law and globalization.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, it has become increasingly clear
that, in order to understand the cross-border development of legal
norms, we need to move beyond the limiting framework of
international law.  In an earlier generation, scholars seeking to study
law on the world stage focused primarily on only two types of
normative systems: those promulgated by nation-states and those
promulgated among nation-states.1  With nation-states as the only
relevant players, the law governing the global system was, of
necessity, exclusively international.  And international law, not
surprisingly, emphasized bilateral and multilateral treaties between
and among states, the activities of the United Nations, the
pronouncements of international tribunals, and (somewhat more
controversially) the norms that states had obeyed for long enough that
such norms could be deemed customary.2  This was a legal universe
with two guiding principles.  First, law was deemed to reside only in
the acts of official, state-sanctioned entities.  Second, law was seen as
an exclusive function of state sovereignty.3
                                                
1. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 (1987).
2. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1), 59
Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993 (stating that the primary sources of international law are
international treaties and conventions, customary practices of states accepted as law, and
general principles of law common to most legal systems).
3. Of course, this is an over-simplified vision of international law.  Obviously, non-
state sources—including the idea of natural law itself—have long played a key role in the
development of international legal principles.  See generally David J. Bederman, Religion
and the Sources of International Law in Antiquity, in THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (Mark W. Janis ed., 1991) (tracing the role of
religion in the Near East during the empires of Egypt, Babylon, Assyria, Hittites, Mittani,
Israelites, Greek city-states, Indian states before 150 B.C., and Mediterranean powers before
168 B.C.).  Indeed, prior to Bentham, these non-state sources, including the universal
common law of jus gentium, were arguably far more important than the norms generated by
states.  See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE  L.J.
2599, 2604 (1997) (reviewing ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995) and
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Both principles, however, have eroded over time.  The rise of
a conception of international human rights in the post-World War II
era transformed individuals into international law stakeholders,
possessing their own entitlements against the state.4  But even apart
from individual empowerment, scholars have more recently come to
recognize the myriad ways in which the prerogatives of nation-states
are cabined by transnational and international actors.  Whereas F.A.
Mann could confidently state in 1984 that “laws extend so far as, but
no further than the sovereignty of the State which puts them into
force,”5 many international law scholars have, at least since the end of
the Cold War, argued that such a narrow view of how law operates
transnationally is inadequate.  Thus, the past fifteen years have seen
increasing attention to the important—though sometimes inchoate—
processes of international norm development.  Some scholars have
sought to define and understand “transnational legal process,” the
ways in which nation-states over time come to internalize
international or transnational norms.6  Others have studied non-
                                                                                                                 
THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995)) (noting
that medieval legal scholars viewed the law of nations, understood as jus naturae et gentium,
as a universal law binding upon all mankind).  For example, during the Middle Ages,
treaties—which are usually viewed today as the positive law of state interaction—were
deemed subject to the overarching jurisdiction of the Church because they were sealed by
oaths.  See ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 24 (1947).
Even after Bentham, no less a theorist than Vattel, while repudiating natural law’s religious
underpinnings (see MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 61 (2003)),
continued to ground international law in the laws of nature.  See E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF
NATIONS, OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF
NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS, at lviii (1797).  In the Nineteenth Century, though positivism
reigned both in the United States and abroad, transnational non-state actors nevertheless
played important roles.  See Koh, supra, at 2612 (noting the work of William Wilberforce
and the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society; Henry Dunant and the International
Committee of the Red Cross; and Christian peace activists, such as America’s William Ladd
and Elihu Burritt, who promoted public international arbitration and permanent international
criminal courts).  And, of course, natural law principles continue to undergird many
international law doctrines, such as jus cogens norms.  See JANIS, supra, at 64.  Thus, the
focus on non-state norm-generation is not a new phenomenon, but I argue that it is re-
emerging as a significant branch of scholarship within international law and might even call
for a reclassification of international law itself.
4. See, e.g., W. MICHAEL REISMAN, Introduction to JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW, at xi, xii (W. Michael Reisman ed., 1999) (noting that “since the Second World War, an
increasing number of international norms of both customary and conventional provenance . . .
now restrict or displace specific law-making and applying competences of states”); Louis
Henkin, Human Rights and State “Sovereignty,” 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 31, 33 (1995–
1996) (“At mid-century, the international system began a slow, hesitant move from state
values towards human values.”).  But see MARK JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 5–6 (1999); GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 34–36 (1957) (both
noting that even after Nuremberg, international law derived primarily from state practice).
5. F.A. MANN, THE DOCTRINE OF INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION REVISITED AFTER
TWENTY YEARS 20 (1984).
6. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181
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traditional legal actors such as non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and their role in defining (and sometimes enforcing) legal
standards.7  And even with regard to classic legal actors such as
courts, scholars have noted the increasing willingness of judges to
apply international norms transnationally,8 to engage in a
transnational judicial dialogue,9 and even to adopt conceptions of
universal jurisdiction.10
Yet, this new emphasis on transnational legal processes,
governmental and non-governmental networks, and judicial influence
and cooperation across borders, while a step in the right direction, still
seems insufficient to describe the complexities of law in an era of
globalization.  Accordingly, scholars are coming to recognize that
international law itself needs an expanded focus, one that situates
cross-border norm development at the intersection of legal
scholarship on conflict of laws, civil procedure, cyberlaw,
comparative law, and the cultural analysis of law, as well as
traditional international law.  Moreover, this new scholarship must be
truly interdisciplinary, drawing on insights not only of international
relations theorists, but also of anthropologists, sociologists, critical
geographers, and cultural studies scholars.  Such insights afford a
more nuanced idea of how people actually form affiliations, construct
communities, and receive and develop legal norms, often with little
                                                                                                                 
(1996) [hereinafter Koh, Transnational Legal Process].  See also Harold Hongju Koh, How
Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397 (1999); Koh, supra note 3.
7. See, e.g., Joel R. Paul, Holding Multinational Corporations Responsible Under
International Law, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 285, 285–86 (2001) (observing that
“private individuals and non-governmental organizations acting both internationally and
domestically are contributing to the emergence of new international norms.  These new
international norms confer greater rights and obligations on private individuals and firms,
shifting the focus of international law.”).
8. See, e.g., Philippe Sands, Turtles and Torturers, The Transformation of
International Law, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 527 (2001); David Sugarman, From
Unimaginable to Possible: Spain, Pinochet, and the Judicialization of Power, 3 J. SPANISH
CULTURAL STUDS. 107 (2002).
9. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103
(2000); Melissa Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial
Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2005).   
See also Janet Koven Levit, Going Public With Transnational Law: The 2002–2003 Supreme
Court Term, 39 TULSA L. REV. 155 (2003).
10. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes:
Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 81 (2001); Leila
Nadya Sadat, Redefining Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW. ENG. L. REV.  241–63 (2001);
Henry J. Steiner, Three Cheers for Universal Jurisdiction—Or Is It Only Two?, 5
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 199 (2004).  For an exhaustive discussion of universal
jurisdiction, including legislative (as well as judicial) enactments, see LUC REYDAMS, SEARCH
TERM END UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES
(2003).
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regard for the fixed set of geographical boundaries that constitute the
nation-state system.
An interdisciplinary study of these processes of international,
transnational, and subnational norm development and interpenetration
does not, of course, render either traditional international law or the
idea of nation-state sovereignty irrelevant, but it does complicate the
picture significantly, prompting the need for a more comprehensive
set of inquiries.  I call this broader frame of analysis “law and
globalization.”  And although I recognize the controversial nature of
the term “globalization,” I believe the idea of law and globalization
provides a useful lens for viewing the way legal norms are
constructed and disseminated in an era when the prerogatives of
territorially delimited nation-states, while not completely
unimportant, have become less salient than they once were.11
To some, the very mention of globalization will seem old hat.
After all, theorizing about globalization has been a cottage industry
both in academia and in the popular media for many years now.  Yet,
although globalization has been an object of study for quite some
time, most of this work has taken place in fields other than law.
Perhaps because legal scholars are so focused on the official organs of
legal power—nation-state governments—they have been less likely to
embrace ideas about norm-development in non-state arenas.  Thus, an
emphasis on law and globalization may encourage legal scholars to
draw upon insights from other academic disciplines.  In addition, even
solely within the legal academy, the idea of law and globalization
may be a useful rubric for conceptualizing areas of commonality
among a variety of fields, thereby drawing traditional international
law scholars into greater dialogue with scholars focusing on conflict
of laws, civil procedure, cyberlaw, cultural analysis of law,
international business transactions, trade finance, and other legal
topics.  In any event, regardless of the label, the main point is that the
idea of international law, as traditionally conceived, seems
insufficient to capture the variety of scholarly approaches that are
emerging, and a new conceptual framework may be useful.
                                                
11. Paul, supra note 7, at 286 (observing that “[g]lobalization . . . has displaced
colonialism and then the cold war as the organizing principle of the international system”).  I
recognize, of course, that the purported “stable” system of sovereignty, territoriality, and
world order that globalization supposedly challenges may never have actually existed.
Instead, such systems have most likely always been contested and in flux.  Yet, one of the
benefits of studying law and globalization is that such study helps us to be reflective both
about the categories we are presupposing and about the way in which discourse about
globalization might actually validate, legitimate, and reinforce this mythical time of order.
See Susan Bibler Coutin et al., In the Mirror: The Legitimation Work of Globalization, 27
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 801 (2002).
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In this Article, I sketch the contours of what it might mean to
emphasize law and globalization, rather than simply international law.
To do so, I suggest in the first Part of this Article four important ways
in which the study of law and globalization enlarges the traditional
focus of international law.  First, studying law and globalization
allows us to expand our conception of what counts as law, thereby
recognizing many non-governmental fora where legal (or quasi-legal)
norms are articulated and disseminated.  Second, law and
globalization can turn the legal gaze to the insights of
interdisciplinary scholarship concerning people’s relationships to
concepts such as space, place, borders, distance, and community
affiliation.  Third, by looking at broader processes of international
norm development, law and globalization can bridge the traditional
doctrinal divide between public and private international law.  Fourth,
law and globalization can contribute to the growing recognition
among international law scholars that the classic conception of
inviolate nation-state sovereignty may be unhelpful in an increasingly
diffuse world of transnational governmental and non-governmental
networks, extraterritorial jurisdictional assertions, rhetorical
statements of legal norms, and permeable borders.
Once international law’s traditional focus has been expanded,
a new scholarly agenda can emerge.  Indeed, this new agenda is
already emerging, as a wide range of scholars have, over the past few
years, begun to take a broader view of the various processes that
constitute the transnational normative order.  Accordingly, in the
second Part of this Article, I identify ten areas of conceptual inquiry
that I believe are already coalescing to form the core of a study of law
and globalization.  Yet, although nearly all of these areas of study
have been subjects of discussion and debate in the international law
literature, they are rarely deployed as overarching frameworks for a
more holistic understanding of law in an interconnected world.  Thus,
simply identifying these core fields of inquiry may help re-orient
international law scholarship around a different set of possible
theoretical questions.12  Significantly, this list includes the contested
idea of globalization itself.
Using these ten tropes, a wide variety of scholars—some of
whom are working in the international law tradition and some not,
some of whom focus on so-called public international law and some
not, some of whom are law professors and some not—are grappling
                                                
12. Cf., e.g., Thomas Buergenthal, The Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Human
Rights Court, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 20 (1985) (“A legal system developed over centuries to
regulate relations between states must make considerable conceptual adjustments to
accommodate the extension of its normative reach to individuals.”).
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with a contemporary world of transnational law-making, cross-border
interaction, and norm penetration among multiple communities.
Taken together, this emerging scholarship helps point the way from
the study of international law to the study of law and globalization.
And its insights allow us to chart a course for a new transnational
century, where networks of governmental and non-governmental
actors (including horrific new networks such as transnational terrorist
organizations) disseminate alternative normative systems across a
diffuse and constantly shifting global landscape.
I. ENLARGING THE FOCUS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Law Beyond Governmental Institutions
International law scholarship has traditionally located
international law in the acts of official governmental bureaucratic
entities, such as the treaties and agreements entered into by nation-
states, the declarations and protocols of the United Nations (UN) or
other affiliated bodies, and the rulings of international courts and
tribunals.13  Because of this relatively narrow focus, scholars of
international law historically have tended to ignore the multifaceted
ways in which legal norms are disseminated, received, resisted, and
imbibed “on the ground” in daily life, thereby missing much of the
complexity of how law operates.  In addition, the emphasis on
“official” law may, paradoxically, have contributed to the pervasive
uneasiness in international law scholarship that international law
might not really be law at all.  If law resides only in the official acts of
a government with coercive power (as the traditional view of
international law believes), then many of the mechanisms of
international law, which lack such coercive power, cannot be law.
Thus, making “law” synonymous with “government” may lead
scholars to over-emphasize the actions of nation-states, because only
at the nation-state level can a government with coercive power be
found.  The rest of international “law,” on this view, amounts to a
mere set of rhetorical statements that are obeyed only when
                                                
13. See, e.g., BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (3d ed.
1999) (“Public international law primarily governed the activities of governments in relation
to other governments.”).  Of course, this is not a complete account of the scope of
international law or international law scholarship.  See supra, note 3.
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convenient to those holding the reins of coercive power.14
But of course, as international law scholars are increasingly
coming to recognize, there is no need to see law as necessarily
encapsulated only by formal governmental acts.  Indeed, with regard
to domestic law, sociolegal scholars have argued for many decades
that law cannot simply be understood as the pronouncements of
official bodies such as legislators and courts.  They have therefore
long since turned their gaze from “law on the books” to “law in
action.”15  In this section, I briefly summarize this scholarship, noting
four areas in which the insights of sociolegal scholars can inform the
study of law and globalization.  First, sociolegal scholars have
emphasized the significance of legal consciousness—the ways in
which people imbibe, transform, and resist legal norms over time.
Second, these scholars have studied the role of lower-level
bureaucrats in the way law is actually implemented in daily life.
Third, the importance of networks of governmental and/or non-
governmental actors has become an increasingly fruitful area of
research.  Fourth, scholarship on legal pluralism has explored the
variety of community affiliations people recognize in their lives, as
well as the multiple and sometimes conflicting norms generated by
such communities.  Each of these areas of study can help expand the
traditional scope of international law scholarship.
1. Legal Consciousness
Over the past four decades, sociolegal scholars have
increasingly emphasized that law is best understood not as an
autonomous system of official rules, but rather as “a distinctive
                                                
14. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2005) (suggesting that international law is simply a product of states pursuing their
interests on the international stage and that international legal norms, therefore, cannot pull
states towards compliance contrary to their interests).  This vision, however, assumes that
states simply have a pre-existing set of interests, which they then pursue in the international
arena.  In contrast, I argue that the interests are themselves shaped over time by changes in
legal norms (and accompanying changes in legal consciousness).  As a result, the very
articulations of international or transnational norms that Goldsmith and Posner deem to be
mere rhetoric are inevitably part of what ultimately constitutes a nation-state’s vision of its
own long-term self-interest.  Thus, although it is certainly true that international legal norms
will not always dictate nation-state behavior, the idea that they have no constraining effect is
unconvincing to anyone who takes the idea of legal consciousness seriously.  For further
discussion of scholarship concerning legal consciousness, see Section I.A.1, infra.
15. For a discussion of the applicability of U.S. sociolegal scholarship to international
law, see Laura A. Dickinson, Introduction to EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (Laura A. Dickinson ed., forthcoming 2005).
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manner of imagining the real.”16  On this view, law operates as much
by influencing modes of thought as by determining conduct in any
specific case.  It is a constitutive part of culture, shaping and
determining social relations.17  For example, “[l]ong before we ever
think about going to a courtroom, we encounter landlords and tenants,
husbands and wives, barkeeps and hotel guests—roles that already
embed a variety of juridical notions.”18  Indeed, we cannot escape the
categories and discourses that law supplies.19  These categories may
include ideas of what is public and what is private, who is an
employer and who is an employee, what precautions are “reasonable,”
who has “rights,” and so on.20  In short, “it is just about impossible to
describe any set of ‘basic’ social practices without describing the
legal relations among the people involved—legal relations that don’t
simply condition how the people relate to each other but to an
important extent define the constitutive terms of the relationship.”21
Because this view of law focuses on the way that legal
categories and ideas suffuse social life,22 scholars have studied the
“legal consciousness” of ordinary citizens, exploring both how people
think about the law and the ways in which largely inchoate ideas
                                                
16. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE
ANTHROPOLOGY 187 (1983).
17. See, e.g., Susan S. Silbey, Making a Place for Cultural Analyses of Law, 17 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 39, 41 (1992) (arguing that “law is a part of the cultural processes that actively
contribute in the composition of social relations”).
18. PAUL KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
124 (1999).
19. Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 105 (1984) (“[I]n
actual historical societies, the law governing social relations—even when never invoked,
alluded to, or even consciously much thought about—has been such a key element in the
constitution of productive relations that it is difficult to see the value . . . of trying to describe
those relations apart from law.”).
20. Indeed,
[p]erhaps the most stunning example of law’s constitutive powers is the
willingness of persons to conceive of themselves as legal subjects, as the kind of
beings the law implies they are—and needs them to be.  Legal subjects think of
themselves as competent, self-directing persons who, for example, enter
bargained-for exchanges as free and equal agents.
Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, Beyond the Great Divide: Forms of Legal Scholarship
and Everyday Life, in LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE 21, 28 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds.,
1993) (citing Peter Gabel & Jay M. Feinman, Contract Law as Ideology, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 172–84 (David Kairys ed., 1982)).
21. Gordon, supra note 19, at 103.
22. See Mark C. Suchman & Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Rational Myths: The New
Institutionalism and the Law & Society Tradition, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 903, 907 (1996)
(“Law and Society scholarship depicts the law as a culturally and structurally embedded
social institution.”).
BERMAN PRINT VERSION.DOC 03/29/05  5:38 PM
2005] LAW AND GLOBALIZATION 495
about the law can affect decisions they make.23  Sally Engle Merry
observes legal consciousness in “the way people conceive of the
‘natural’ and normal way of doing things, their habitual patterns of
talk and action, and their commonsense understanding of the world.”24
These understandings are often taken for granted.  This is because
legal consciousness may be so much a part of an individual’s
worldview that it is present even when law is seemingly absent from
an understanding or construction of life events.25  Thus, “[w]e are not
merely the inert recipients of law’s external pressures.  Rather, we
have imbibed law’s images and meanings so that they seem our
own.”26  Law is an often unnoticed, but nevertheless crucial, presence
                                                
23.  Indeed, various studies have explored the legal consciousness of average citizens.
See, e.g., KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE  CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY (1988); PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN
S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998);  MALCOLM
M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL
COURT (1979); MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE
POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994); SALLY E. MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING
EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS (1990); BARBARA
YNGVESSON, VIRTUOUS CITIZENS, DISRUPTIVE SUBJECTS: ORDER AND COMPLAINT IN A NEW
ENGLAND COURT (1993); Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, Conformity, Contestation, and
Resistance: An Account of Legal Consciousness, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 731 (1992); Laura
Beth Nielsen, Situating Legal Consciousness: Experiences and Attitudes of Ordinary Citizens
about Law and Street Harassment, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1055 (2000); Austin Sarat,
“. . .The Law Is All Over”: Power, Resistance, and the Legal Consciousness of the Welfare
Poor, 2 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 343 (1990); Austin Sarat & William L. F. Felstiner, Lawyers
and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk in the Divorce Lawyer’s Office, 98 YALE L.J. 1663
(1998–99).
24. MERRY, supra note 23, at 5.  See also, e.g., Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon, Beyond
Legal Realism?: Cultural Analysis, Cultural Studies, and the Situation of Legal Scholarship,
13 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 3, 19 (2001) (“Law is part of the everyday world, contributing
powerfully to the apparently stable, taken-for-granted quality of that world and to the
generally shared sense that as things are, so must they be.”); Gordon, supra note 19, at 101
(arguing that we should “treat legal forms as ideologies and rituals whose ‘effects’—effects
that include people’s ways of sorting out social experience, giving it meaning, grading it as
natural, just, and necessary or as contrived, unjust and subject to alteration—are in the realm
of consciousness”).
25. David M. Trubeck, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36
STAN. L. REV. 575, 604 (1984) (“Law, like other aspects of belief systems, helps to define the
role of an individual in society and the relations with others that make sense.”).  See also
JEAN COMAROFF, BODY OF POWER, SPIRIT OF RESISTANCE: CULTURE AND HISTORY OF A
SOUTH AFRICAN PEOPLE 4–5 (1985) (arguing that consciousness is “embedded in the practical
constitution of everyday life, part and parcel of the process whereby the subject is constructed
by external sociocultural forms.”).
26. Sarat & Kearns, supra note 20, at 29.  See also Gordon, supra note 19, at 109
(“[T]he power exerted by a legal regime consists less in the force that it can bring to bear
against violators of its rules than in its capacity to persuade people that the world described in
its images and categories is the only attainable world in which a sane person would want to
live.”).
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in our ideas of what is fair, appropriate, or natural.27
In considering legal consciousness, moreover, we must
remember that law is not simply the official texts of treaties, judicial
opinions, and legislative acts that embody formal legal rules, nor is it
just the formal legal institutions of courts, lawyers and police.
Accordingly, instead of focusing solely on laws and official legal
actors,28 legal consciousness research examines the wide variety of
“quasi-legal” discourses, such as abstract (and often intuitive) ideas of
street justice, due process, civil disobedience, retribution, deterrence,
and rights, all of which are frequently invoked in public discussions
and dinner-table conversations alike.
Finally, the study of legal consciousness also makes clear that
the relationship between law and culture is not unidirectional.  While
legal categories do shape broader social discourse, at the same time
law talk, diffused throughout society, becomes a source of alternative
conceptions of law:
Legality operates through social life as persons and
groups deliberately interpret and invoke law’s
language, authority, and procedures to organize their
lives and manage their relationships.  In short, the
commonplace operation of law in daily life makes us
all legal agents insofar as we actively make law, even
when no formal legal agent is involved.29
This focus on law in everyday life30 recognizes that people interpret
                                                
27. See Gordon, supra note 19, at 111 (“In short, the legal forms we use set limits on
what we can imagine as practical options: Our desires and plans tend to be shaped out of the
limited stock of forms available to us: The forms thus condition not just our power to get
what we want but what we want (or think we can get) itself.”).  Indeed, scholars have noted
that people’s judgments about praise and blame will often match the corresponding legal
categories, even when those people are not familiar in detail with legal rules and doctrines.
See, e.g., THE ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY (Max Gluckman ed., 1972).
28. For example, Gordon notes that, if law is only “a bunch of discrete events that occur
within certain specialized state agencies . . . how on earth are we going to characterize all the
innumerable rights, duties, privileges, and immunities that people commonly recognize and
enforce without officials anywhere nearby?”  Gordon, supra note 19, at 107.  Thus, slavery
may begin as a temporary arrangement during an emergency harvesting season, then slowly
become a taken-for-granted custom over the next few years, and only much later become
codified into official legislation.  According to Gordon, a scholar “who began her account of
slave law . . . with the codifications would rightly be accused of leaving out the most
important part of the story.”  Id. at 108.  Instead, he contends that “the legal institution of
slavery” begins whenever we find “the ordinary practices and discourses of [the] society
assuming or appealing to the collectively shared and maintained notions of right and
obligation that support that institution, the moment when power becomes institutionalized as
‘right.’”  Id.
29. EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 23, at 20.
30. See, e.g., LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1993).
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their experiences by drawing on a collaboration of law and other
social structures.31  These interpretations may be widely varied and
will, of course, depend in part on each person’s social class, previous
contact with the law, and political standing.32  Nevertheless, legal
consciousness constitutes an ongoing interaction between official
norms as embodied in the common sense categories of daily life and
each individual’s ongoing participation in the process of constructing
legality.33  Accordingly, legal consciousness includes the ways in
which individuals themselves deploy, transform, or subvert official
legal understandings and thereby “construct” law on the ground.34
We all always take part in the construction of legal consciousness,
even as we are also inevitably affected by the legal categories of the
social structures around us.
These varied processes of legal consciousness have not often
been the subject of international legal scholarship.  Instead,
international law scholars have tended to study formal legal
mechanisms and have largely ignored the more inchoate development
of ideas about legality within populations.  Of course, formal legal
rules are often relevant to the formation of legal consciousness, but
they are only the tip of the iceberg.  Any comprehensive study of the
development of international and transnational norms must consider a
more complex web of psychological and sociological phenomena.
2. The Role of Bureaucrats
In shifting the focus away from the formal acts of
governments at the macro level, sociolegal scholars have turned their
attention not only to the legal consciousness that permeates everyday
                                                
31. See, e.g., David Engel & Frank Munger, Rights, Remembrance, and the
Reconciliation of Difference, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 7 (1996); Sarat, supra note 23.
32. See, e.g., Carroll Seron & Frank Munger, Law and Inequality: Race, Gender . . .
and of Course, Class, 22 ANN. REV. SOC. 187 (1996); Davina Cooper, Local Government
Legal Consciousness in the Shadow of Juridification. 22 J. L. SOC’Y 506 (1995).
33. “Legality” is defined as those meanings, sources of authority, and cultural practices
that are in some sense legal although not necessarily approved or acknowledged by official
law.  The concept of legality offers the opportunity to consider “how, where and with what
effect law is produced in and through commonplace social interactions . . . .  How do our
social roles and statuses, our relationships, our obligations, prerogatives, and responsibilities,
our identities, and our behaviors bear the imprint of law?”  EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 23,
at 20.  See also Sarat & Kearns, supra note 20, at 55. (“[L]aw is continuously shaped and
reshaped by the ways it is used, even as law’s constitutive power constrains patterns of
usage.”).
34. See, e.g., BUMILLER, supra note 23, at 30–32; MCCANN, supra note 23; MERRY,
supra note 23, at 9; EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 23, at 731–49.
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life, but also to the ways that law actually ends up being applied (or
subverted) through the discretionary acts of lower-level bureaucrats.
This scholarship reveals that law is almost never “delivered” on the
ground in the pure form that treaties, legislation, or constitutional
court decisions would indicate.  Thus, international law scholars are
in danger of missing how norms actually operate if they over-
emphasize the grand statements made at the highest levels of
government.35
Legal scholars and policymakers have an unfortunate tendency
to assume that legal norms, once established, simply take effect and
constitute a legal regime.36  As Carol Weisbrod has observed, even
theorists who position themselves in opposition to prevailing legal
norms tend to privilege official legal pronouncements as the relevant
site for locating (or changing) law.37  Yet, scholarship on the
operation of law in bureaucratic settings has emphasized the degree to
which the imperatives of bureaucracies and the exercise of discretion
by individual agents often affect (or even determine) the operation of
law.38  As Theda Skocpol has pointed out, the state is “not just [ . . . ]
a set of formal offices, but . . . sets of relationships among all who
‘participated in some identifiable behavioral interaction connected
with state actions.’”39  Contemporary sociolegal scholarship therefore
recognizes that important aspects of legal life occur within
bureaucratic settings, such as law firms, regulatory agencies, and
corporations.
For example, in order to meet statutory goals, individual
                                                
35. Some international law scholars have, in recent years, sought to analyze the
relationship between governmental acts and on-the-ground changes in behavior.  See Oona
Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002); Ryan
Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties (Harvard Law
School, Public Law Working Paper No. 56, March 2003), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=391643; Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence
States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2005).
36. See, e.g., JOSEPH TUSSMAN, OBLIGATION AND THE BODY POLITIC 73 (1960) (“Taking
law as central we develop theories of the state as a legal order or as the ‘rule of law.’”).
37. See Carol Weisbrod, Practical Polyphony: Theories of the State and Feminist
Jurisprudence, 24 GA. L. REV. 985, 995–96 (1990) (“[F]eminist legal scholars, like others in
legal academic life, tend to address the powerful and to translate the question ‘What is to be
Done?’ into the question ‘What should the State, acting through its judges, do?’” (internal
citation omitted)).
38. This discussion largely tracks a useful summary of the early literature provided in
Susan Silbey, Case Processing: Consumer Protection in an Attorney General’s Office, 15
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 849, 850 (1980–81).  For a more recent discussion, see, for example,
Suchman & Edelman, supra note 22, at 907, and ALFRED BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW: THE
TRANSMISSION SYSTEM AND EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY (1993).
39. Theda Skocpol, Social History and Historical Sociology: Contrasts and
Complementarities, 11 SOC. SCI. HIST. 17, 26 (1987) (internal citation omitted).
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agents of law enforcement—whether police officers, court officials,
or members of administrative agencies—must always exercise
discretion.  Although statutes (or treaties) theoretically limit the range
of permissible official action, they rarely if ever can determine
precisely how the statutory mandates are accomplished.  Thus,
enforcement agents, in choosing which cases to act on and which to
let go, which inquiries to follow up on and which to ignore, which
presumptive litigants to take seriously and which to treat as
undeserving of judicial attention, necessarily “become the agents of
clarification and elaboration of their own authorizing mandates.”40  By
working out authorizing norms in organizational settings, these
bureaucrats largely determine how a given law actually operates on
the ground, in ways that may support, supplement, resist, or supplant
the formal requirements of that law.
Moreover, in elaborating statutory mandates, bureaucracies
inevitably modify the goals they were designed to serve.  For
example, research indicates that members of organizations may cope
with various political, social, and environmental pressures (e.g., too
many cases to process) by developing routines and simplifications
that economize on resources.  In addition, when evaluating their own
effectiveness, they are apt to develop metrics that their procedures are
more likely to meet.  In this process, “they may alter the concept of
their job, redefine their clientele, and effectively displace the
organization’s stated mandate.”41
Even in more explicitly “legal” contexts such as courts, where
we might expect the formal statutory mandates to hold most sway,
research indicates that the discretionary acts of lower-level court
officers often determine the dispensation of justice.  For example,
Barbara Yngvesson studied “show cause” hearings held in a western
Massachusetts criminal court.42  These hearings mark the earliest
phase of the criminal procedure in cases in which there has been no
arrest.  They are conducted by the court clerk, who has the
discretionary power either to allow a complaint application and issue
a criminal charge, or to deny it and handle the matter “informally” in
the hearing itself.  As Yngvesson notes,
[I]n local conflicts the clerk acts both as “gatekeeper,”
keeping what is “not legal” out of the court proper, and
                                                
40. Silbey, supra note 38, at 850 (internal citation omitted).
41. Id. at 851 (internal citation omitted).
42. See Barbara Yngvesson, Making Law at the Doorway:  The Clerk, the Court, and the
Construction of Community in a New England Town, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 409 (1988)
[hereinafter Yngvesson, Making Law at the Doorway].  See also YNGVESSON, supra note 23.
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as a peacemaker.  The clerk’s position at the court also
allows him to play what one clerk defined as a local
“watchdog” role, controlling “problem” people and
“brainless” behavior in the communities in the court’s
jurisdiction.43
As such, the informal interactions between the clerk and the litigants
construct the “law” in actual practice and also function as a site for
the imposition and contestation of social prejudices, class differences,
and moral judgment about the litigants and their claims.
These various studies conducted in the domestic arena offer
important insights for international law scholars.  Institutional
bureaucracies are a fundamental part of both international
organizations and the domestic governments that often implement
international norms.  This research, therefore, taken together, provides
an important reminder that law is not just a set of legal rules, treaties,
or international standards, but a myriad of local social and
institutional interactions.  Moreover, these interactions exert
tremendous influence on how justice is actually administered.
International law scholars, therefore, must take account of lower-level
bureaucrats and their exercise of discretionary power, as well as the
internal structures of organizational bureaucracies.
3. Governmental and Non-governmental Networks
In thinking about forms of international cooperation in the
Twenty-first Century, scholars have been drawn to the study of
networks, both those among governmental authorities44 and those
                                                
43. Yngvesson, Making Law at the Doorway, supra note 42, at 410.
44. See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); George A.
Bermann et al., Introduction to TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION: LEGAL
PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS 1, 1 (George A. Bermann et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter
TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION] (“While national authorities are still the
principal actors in the regulatory arena, regulation is increasingly an international affair.”);
Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Regulatory Cooperation and Managed Mutual Recognition: Elements of
a Strategic Model, in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION, supra, at 571
(“Regulatory cooperation deserves analytical attention both in its own right and as a
forerunner for the effect of interdependence on other policy areas and international
governance in general.”); Paul B. Stephan, Regulatory Cooperation and Competition: The
Search for Virtue, in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION, supra, at 202 (“By almost
any standard of measurement, international regulatory cooperation has grown significantly in
the last two decades and promises to expand even further.”).  See also TRANSATLANTIC
GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer eds., 2001);
Scott C. Fulton & Lawrence I. Sperling, The Network of Environmental Enforcement and
Compliance Cooperation in North America and the Western Hemisphere, 30 INT’L LAW. 111
(1996); Sol Picciotto, Networks in International Economic Integration: Fragmented States
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connecting non-governmental entities.45  Indeed, because the system
of liberal institutionalism—in which states enter into treaties and
create formal international organizations—is perceived to be waning,
the study of networks provides a theoretical explanation for the
continued (and perhaps increasing) interdependence among states.
Similarly, the rise of a global (and internet-savvy) civil society has
drawn attention to the roles that networks of NGOs may play in
formulating norms transnationally.
With regard to government networks, interest among political
scientists dates back at least to 1974, when Joseph Nye and Robert
Keohane defined “trans-governmental relations” as “sets of direct
interactions among sub-units of different governments that are not
controlled or closely guided by the policies of the cabinets or chief
executives of those governments.”46  Noting that foreign relations is
often conducted through the formal and informal interactions of
bureaucrats from various countries, they attempted to discern both the
conditions under which trans-governmental networks are most likely
to form, and the various types of interactions that can take place
between international organizations and trans-governmental
networks.47
After the end of the bi-polar Cold War order, scholars began
focusing on what was seen to be an era of complex, multi-level,
global governance, tied together by networks.48  Anne-Marie
                                                                                                                 
and the Dilemmas of Neo-Liberalism, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1014 (1996–97); Kal
Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and
the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2002); Gregory Shaffer, The Power of
E.U. Collective Action: The Impact of E.U. Data Privacy Regulation on U.S. Business
Practice, 5 EUR. L.J. 419 (1999); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Accountability of Government
Networks, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 347 (2001); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Government
Networks: The Heart of the Liberal Democratic Order, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 199 (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000); Spencer Weber
Waller, The Internationalization of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 B.U. L. REV. 343 (1997);
David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International
Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 281 (1998).
45. See, e.g., Julie Mertus, From Legal Transplants to Transformative Justice: Human
Rights and the Promise of Trans-National Civil Society, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1335
(1999).
46. Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and
International Organizations, 27 WORLD POL. 39, 43 (1974).
47. Id. at 42.
48. See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE (1999);
GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS (James N.
Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992); JAMES N. ROSENAU, ALONG THE DOMESTIC-
FOREIGN FRONTIER: EXPLORING GOVERNANCE IN A TURBULENT WORLD (1997); Gerry Stoker,
Governance as Theory: Five Propositions, 155 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 17 (1998).
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Slaughter traces this scholarly turn to a series of specific influences.49
For example, the 1990s saw the creation of the Financial Stability
Forum, a network composed of three trans-governmental
organizations—The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, The
International Organization of Securities Commissioners, and the
International Association of Insurance Supervisors—along with other
national and international officials responsible for financial stability
around the world.50  These “organizations” did not seem to fit the
classic model for international organizations; they were neither
composed of states nor constituted by treaty, they did not enjoy legal
personality, and they had no physical headquarters or stationery.51  In
addition, scholars noted the emergence of a new “multi-layered
regulatory system,” concentrated among Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development countries.52  This system involved
trans-governmental networks formed to develop strategies for
regulatory cooperation in response to deepening economic and
financial integration and increasing interdependence across a wide
range of issues.  Then, in the wake of the completion of the single
market in 1992, the European Union itself emerged as a “regulatory
state” and sought to harmonize (or at least reconcile) the regulations
of its diverse and growing members through a series of networks
located in the Council of Ministers.53  Finally, scholars noted the
emergence of a system of “transatlantic governance” to help foster
and manage the increasingly dense web of transatlantic economic
cooperation.54  The growing focus on networks, therefore was seen as
part of a broader shift from “government” to “governance.”55
Of course, this proliferation of regulatory networks has been
controversial.56  For example, regulation via governmental networks
                                                
49. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information
Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1041, 1046–48 (2003).
50. Id. at 1046.
51. See id. at 1047 n.17.
52. See id. at 1047 n.19.
53. Id. at 1047.
54. See id. at 1048; Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer, Transatlantic Governance
in Historical and Theoretical Perspective, in TRANSATLANTIC GOVERNANCE IN THE  GLOBAL
ECONOMY, supra note 44, at 3, 3–5.
55. Picciotto, supra note 44, at 1039.
56. See, e.g., Robert Howse, Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation and the Problem of
Democracy, in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION, supra note 44, at 469; Anne-
Marie Slaughter, Agencies on the Loose? Holding Government Networks Accountable, in
TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION, supra note 44, at 521; Philip Alston, The
Myopia of the Handmaidens: International Lawyers and Globalization, 8 EUR. J. INT’L L.
435 (1997); José E. Alvarez, Do Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of Slaughter’s
Liberal Theory, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 183 (2001).
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may reduce transparency and impede political accountability.57
Networks also may be subject to capture by powerful interests, such
as stakeholders from regulated industries or economically dominant
nation-states.58  Nevertheless, it is difficult to discount the importance
of these networks for understanding governance in the Twenty-first
Century.
In addition to these regulatory networks, we see networks of
judges as well.59  Indeed, the growing willingness of judges to
consider transnational norms may stem in part from the increase in
face-to-face interaction among judges from around the world.
Foundation and government funding have provided the impetus for a
wide variety of “rule of law” programs that include judicial seminars
and training sessions.60  Such events have offered opportunities for
interaction.  In addition, judges themselves have organized meetings
with their counterparts from around the world.  For example, in recent
years several delegations of United States Supreme Court Justices
have met with top jurists in France, Germany, England, and India.61
In 1998, Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer traveled
to Brussels to meet with judges from the European Court of Justice
(ECJ),62 and in 2000, several members of the ECJ visited the U.S.
Supreme Court Justices in Washington.63  Elsewhere, judges from
European constitutional courts have met every two to three years
since the 1980s,64 Worldwide Common Law Judiciary Conferences
                                                
57. See Raustiala, supra note 44, at 5 n.14.
58. See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in
International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 743, 744 (1999) (arguing that international
harmonization efforts are often the product of rent-seeking by various industry groups).  As
Stephen Toope argues, “[n]etworks. . . . are sites of power, and potentially of exclusion and
inequality.”  Stephen Toope, Emerging Patterns of Governance and International Law, in
THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 96–97 (Michael Byers ed., 2000).  Similarly,
David Kennedy has questioned whether we should celebrate the “disaggregation of the state
and the empowerment of diverse actors in an international ‘civil society’ without asking who
will win and who will lose by such an arrangement.”  David Kennedy, When Renewal
Repeats: Thinking Against the Box, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 335, 412 (2000).
59. See, e.g., Levit, supra note 9; Slaughter, supra note 9; Waters, supra note 9.
60. See, e.g., Jacques deLisle, Lex Americana?: United States Legal Assistance,
American Legal Models, and Legal Change in the Post-Communist World and Beyond, 20 U.
PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 179, 184–93 (1999) (surveying governmental and non-governmental
rule of law programs); Joseph P. Nadeau, Judges Abroad, Algeria 2001: Quest for
Democracy, JUDGES J., 38, 38–40 (Summer 2001) (describing one judge’s participation in an
advocacy training program held in Algiers and sponsored by the U.S. Agency for
International Development, several foundations and NGOs).
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have been held since 1995,65 and formal transnational organizations of
judges have been established in the Americas66 and in the Baltics.67
Less formal meetings have also been convened by various aid
agencies, NGOs, and law schools.68  Additionally, in recent years
Chief Justice Rehnquist and the U.S. Judicial Conference created a
Committee on International Judicial Relations, the purpose of which
is to “coordinate the federal judiciary’s relationship with foreign
judiciaries and with official and unofficial agencies and organizations
interested in international judicial relations and the establishment and
expansion of the rule of law and administration of justice.”69  Such
efforts may help judges see their work as part of a common
transnational enterprise.
While many political scientists and international relations
scholars have focused primarily on networks of governmental actors,
scholars at the intersection of law and anthropology,70 along with
theorists interested in global civil society and the role of “norm
entrepreneurs” in shaping governmental policy,71 have stressed the
                                                
65. Justices, Judges from Common Law Countries Meet in Williamsburg and
Washington, INT’L JUD. OBSERVER, Sept. 1995, at 1, 3; Judges from Ten Common-Law
Countries Meet in Washington for Five-Day Conference, INT’L JUD. OBSERVER, June 1997, at
1, 1.
66. See Slaughter, supra note 9, at 1120 (describing the creation and mission of the
Organization of Supreme Courts of the Americas).
67. See Hon. Rait Maruste, Estonia: Leading Central Europe in Judicial Reform, INT’L
JUD. OBSERVER,  Jan. 1996, at 2, 3 (“To promote cooperation, Estonian judges have joined
their colleagues in Latvia and Lithuania to form the Association of Judges of the Baltic
States . . . .”).
68. See Slaughter, supra note 9, at 1121–22 (noting the international outreach efforts of
various NGOs and law schools).
69. Hon. Michael M. Mihm, International Judicial Relations Committee Promotes
Communication, Coordination, INT’L JUD. OBSERVER, Sept. 1995, at 1, 4.
70. See, e.g., ANNELISE RILES, THE NETWORK INSIDE OUT (2000); Sally Engle Merry,
Constructing a Global Law: Violence Against Women and the Human Rights System, 28 LAW
& SOC. INQUIRY 941 (2003).
71. See Ethan A. Nadelmann, Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in
International Society, 44 INT’L ORG. 479, 482 (1990) (defining “transnational moral
entrepreneurs” as nongovernmental transnational organizations who (1) “mobilize popular
opinion and political support both within their host country and abroad;” (2) “stimulate and
assist in the creation of like-minded organizations in other countries;” (3) “play a significant
role in elevating their objective beyond its identification with the national interests of their
government;” and (4) often direct their efforts “toward persuading foreign audiences,
especially foreign elites, that a particular prohibition regime reflects a widely shared or even
universal moral sense, rather than the peculiar moral code of one society”).  See also Cass R.
Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 929 (1996) (describing
similar domestic concept of “norm entrepreneurs” who “can alert people to the existence of a
shared complaint and can suggest a collective solution . . . by (a) signalling their own
commitment to change, (b) creating coalitions, (c) making defiance of the norms seem or be
less costly, and (d) making compliance with new norms seem or be more beneficial”).
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importance of non-governmental networks as well.  Such networks
are seen as part of the wide variety of “complex, postnational social
formations.”72  Simply listing examples gives a sense of the scope.
Diaspora communities play an increasing role in the global flow of
capital.73  Transnational philanthropic movements such as Habitat for
Humanity send volunteers around the globe to build new
environments.74  Global public policy networks, ranging in subject
matter from crime to fisheries to public health, have emerged during
the past decade, bringing together loose alliances of government
agencies, international organizations, corporations, and NGOs.75  In
addition, such global public policy networks form only one part of a
“nascent international civil society”76 that includes NGOs as well as
business and trade union networks, often operating in conjunction
                                                                                                                 
Current work on international norm entrepreneurs builds on seminal articles on the subject
both in international relations and international law.  See, e.g., Martha Finnemore & Kathryn
Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887 (1998);
Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS.
L. REV. 623, 647 (1998).
72. ARJUN APPADURAI, Patriotism and Its Futures, in MODERNITY AT LARGE:
CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF GLOBALIZATION 158, 158, 167 (1996) [hereinafter MODERNITY AT
LARGE] (noting that “[t]hese formations are now organized around principles of finance,
recruitment, coordination, communication, and reproduction that are fundamentally
postnational and not just multinational or international.”).
73. See, e.g., Anupam Chander, Diaspora Bonds, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1005, 1060–74
(2001) (describing a debt instrument offered by a homeland government to raise capital
principally from its diaspora); id. at 1012 n.29 (summarizing a World Bank report on
diasporas’ important role in facilitating the dissemination of information and capital across
borders).
74. APPADURAI, supra note 72, at 167.
75. See Wolfgang H. Reinicke, The Other World Wide Web: Global Public Policy
Networks, FOREIGN POL’Y, Winter 1999/2000, at 44–45 (“[G]lobal public policy networks
have emerged over the last decade, experimenting with new ways to gather knowledge and
disseminate information on specific issues.”).
76. MICHAEL EDWARDS, FUTURE POSITIVE: INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 179 (1999).  See also RICHARD FALK, PREDATORY GLOBALIZATION: A CRITIQUE 138
(1999) (describing “global civil society”); THOMAS PRINCEN & MATHIAS FINGER,
ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS IN WORLD POLITICS: LINKING THE LOCAL AND THE GLOBAL 10 (1994)
(noting that environmental NGOs are shifting from operating solely at the national level to
operating at the local and global levels); MARTIN SHAW, GLOBAL SOCIETY AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 5–9 (1995) (arguing that the only way to discuss society is in the
international context); Richard Falk, An Inquiry into the Political Economy of World Order, 1
NEW POL. ECON. 13, 24 (1996) (describing “grassroots globalism” as a “movement of social
forces, with a transnational democratising outlook”); Miguel Darcy de Oliveira & Rajesh
Tandon, An Emerging Global Civil Society, in CITIZENS STRENGTHENING GLOBAL CIVIL
SOCIETY 1, 2 (Miguel Darcy de Oliveira & Rajesh Tandon eds., 1994) (discussing the
extension of “solidarity and responsibility to the public sphere on a global scale”); Paul
Wapner, Politics Beyond the State: Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics, 47
WORLD POL. 311, 312–13 (1995) (describing global civil society as “world collective life,”
which “exists above the individual and below the state, but across national boundaries”).
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with corresponding networks of government regulators.77
In contrast to the growth of global civil society, the
development of transnational terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda is a
much darker example of non-governmental networks.  (The networks
surrounding human trafficking and the global narcotics trade are other
examples.)  Such organizations can mobilize personnel and deploy
money around the world, functioning as quasi-state entities.78  Indeed,
it is significant that the United States has been willing to treat Al
Qaeda almost as if it were a sovereign state to be fought in a “war.”
NATO invoked Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, which pledges
each signatory country to defend the others in the event of an armed
attack,79 thereby treating the events of September 11, 2001 more as a
military action than a criminal one.80  In addition, the Bush
administration has repeatedly asserted the authority to try Al Qaeda
                                                
77. See EDWARDS, supra note 76, at 178–79 (asserting that “building upwards from new
experiments in local politics and constitutional reform at the national level” will help in
constructing international civil societies).  See also JOHN VOGLER, THE GLOBAL COMMONS:
ENVIRONMENTAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL GOVERNANCE 20–41 (2d ed. 2000) (using “regime
analysis” to review such complex international cooperative efforts).
78. See Foreign & Commonwealth Office, U.K., Responsibility for the Terrorist
Atrocities in the United States, 11 September 2001: An Updated Account  2 (Nov. 14, 2001)
(“Al Qaida is a terrorist organisation with ties to a global network . . . . [The organization]
includes training camps, warehouses, communications facilities and commercial operations
able to raise significant sums of money to support its activity.”), available at
http://www.pm.gov.uk/files/pdf/culpability_document1.pdf; Sam Dillon, Indictment by
Spanish Judge Portrays a Secret Terror Cell, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2001, at A1 (describing
the formation and emergence of a European Al Qaeda cell); Susan Sachs, An Investigation in
Egypt Illustrates Al Qaeda’s Web, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2001, at A1 (describing the ease
with which Al Qaeda “move[s] money around the globe”); Benjamin Weiser & Tim Golden,
Al Qaeda: Sprawling, Hard-to-Spot Web of Terrorists-in-Waiting, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30,
2001, at B4 (discussing the training and mobilization of Al Qaeda militants).  Other terrorist
(or revolutionary) movements have similarly global links.  See, e.g., Vladimir Kucherenko,
Cause and Effect Nature of Globalization and Terror Argued, WORLD NEWS CONNECTION,
Sept. 13, 2001, 2001 WL 27854157 (citing “the Tamil movement fighting in Sri Lanka and
southern India;” “[t]he guerrilla armies of Latin America which work closely with the drugs
barons; the Kosovo terrorists in cahoots with the Albanian mafia in Europe; certain Arab
groups; and the Chechen bandit[s]” as examples of quasi-state entities that utilize global
technology to facilitate the flow of money and coordination of their activities).
79. The North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244, 34 U.N.T.S.
243, 246, declares:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or
North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently
they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them . . . will assist the
Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with
the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed
force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
80. See NATO to Support U.S. Retaliation, CNN.COM (Sept. 12, 2001), at http://
www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/09/12/nato.us/index.html (reporting that NATO had
invoked Article V in response to the September 11 attacks, the first invocation of the
provision in fifty-two years).
BERMAN PRINT VERSION.DOC 03/29/05  5:38 PM
2005] LAW AND GLOBALIZATION 507
operatives before military commissions, apparently based in part on
the belief that the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon
were not simply crimes, but violations of the laws of war, which have
customarily been reserved for state entities.81  Regardless of whether
or not this conceptualization of Al Qaeda is correct, it is clear that, in
both beneficial and destructive ways, non-governmental networks are
sure to be an important force in shaping norms for the new century.
4. Legal Pluralism
International law scholars seeking to understand the
multifaceted role of law in settings beyond governmental institutions
must also take seriously the insights of legal pluralism.  In general,
theorists of pluralism start from the premise that people belong to (or
feel affiliated with) multiple groups and understand themselves to be
bound by the norms of these multiple groups.82  Such groups can, of
course, include familiar political affiliations, such as nation-states,
counties, towns, and so on.  But many community affiliations, such as
those held by transnational or subnational ethnic groups, religious
institutions, trade organizations, unions, internet chat groups, and a
myriad of other “norm-generating communities”83 may at various
times exert tremendous power over our actions even though they are
not part of an “official” state-based system.  Legal pluralists have
therefore tended to study those situations in which two or more of
these normative systems occupy the same social field.84  Of course,
                                                
81. See, e.g., Hearing on Military Tribunals Before the Subcomm. on the Judiciary
(Dec. 4, 2001) (testimony of Pierre-Richard Prosper, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes),
2001 WL 1591408, at *17 (“As the president’s order [establishing military commissions]
recognizes, we must call these attacks by the rightful name, ‘war crime.’”).  To be sure, the
administration has also attempted to prosecute alleged “terrorists” through standard domestic
law channels, but even in this context, the government has sought various restrictions on due
process because of the nature of the charges and the alleged terrorist inclinations of the
defendant.  Paradoxically, while treating suspected Al Qaeda operatives as equivalent to
enemy soldiers for purposes of the military commissions, the Bush administration has
rejected the idea that these operatives are entitled to the rights of soldiers provided by the
Geneva Conventions.  See Donald H. Rumsfeld, Department of Defense News Briefing (Jan.
11, 2002) available at http://www.dod.gov/news/Jan2002/t01112002_t0111sd.html).
82. See, e.g., AVIGAIL I. EISENBERG, RECONSTRUCTING POLITICAL PLURALISM 2 (1995)
(pluralist theories “seek to organize and conceptualize political phenomena on the basis of the
plurality of groups to which individuals belong and by which individuals seek to advance
and, more important, to develop, their interests”).
83. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 43 (1983).
84. See, e.g., CAROL WEISBROD, EMBLEMS OF PLURALISM: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND
THE STATE (2002); David Engel, Legal Pluralism in an American Community: Perspectives
on a Civil Trial Court, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 425; Marc Galanter, Justice in Many
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legal pluralism includes within its purview the non-governmental
networks discussed in the previous section.  However, pluralism is a
broader category because it also addresses a variety of other forms of
non-state normative ordering.  Moreover, the literature on legal
pluralism is almost completely distinct from that on networks, so
separate treatment seems warranted.
Historically, legal pluralists focused on the overlapping
normative systems created during the process of colonization.  Early
Twentieth-Century studies of indigenous law among tribes and
villages in colonized societies noted the simultaneous existence of
both indigenous law and European law.  More recent work has
defined the idea of a “legal system” sufficiently broadly to include
many non-official forms of normative ordering.  On this view, non-
state communities assert lawmaking power through more informal
networks and organizations and through the slow accretion of social
custom itself.  Thus, “not all the phenomena related to law and not all
that are law-like have their source in the government.”85
Indeed, prior to the rise of the state system, much lawmaking
took place in autonomous institutions and within smaller units such as
cities and guilds, while large geographic areas were left largely
unregulated.86  Even in modern nation-states, we see a whole range of
non-state lawmaking in tribal or ethnic enclaves,87 religious
organizations,88 corporate bylaws, social customs,89 private regulatory
                                                                                                                 
Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM &
UNOFFICIAL L. 1, 28–34 (1981); John Griffiths, What Is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL
PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1 (1986); Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 869, 870 (1988).
85. Sally Falk Moore, Legal Systems of the World, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
15 (Leon Lipson & S. Wheeler eds., 1986).  See also Gunther Teubner, The Two Faces of
Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1443 (1992) (“[L]egal pluralism is
at the same time both: social norms and legal rules, law and society, formal and informal,
rule-oriented and spontaneous.”).  But see Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Folly of the ‘Social
Scientific’ Concept of Legal Pluralism, 20 J. L. & SOC’Y 192, 193 (1993) (arguing that such a
broad view of “law” causes law to lose any distinctive meaning).
86. See EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 14–38
(Walter L. Moll trans., 1936) (analyzing and describing the differences between legal and
nonlegal norms).  See generally OTTO GIERKE, ASSOCIATIONS AND LAW: THE CLASSICAL AND
EARLY CHRISTIAN STAGES (George Heiman ed. & trans., Univ. of Toronto Press 1977) (n.d.)
(setting forth a legal philosophy based on the concept of association as a fundamental human
organizing principle); OTTO GIERKE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF SOCIETY: 1500 TO
1800 (Ernest Barker trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1934) (1913) (presenting a theory of the
evolution of the state and non-state groups according to the principle of natural law).
87. See, e.g., Walter Otto Weyrauch & Maureen Anne Bell, Autonomous Lawmaking:
The Case of the “Gypsies,” 103 YALE L.J. 323 (1993) (delineating the subtle interactions
between the legal system of the Romani people and the norms of their host countries).
88. See, e.g., CAROL WEISBROD, THE BOUNDARIES OF UTOPIA (1980) (examining the
contractual underpinnings of four Nineteenth-Century American religious utopian
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bodies, and a wide variety of groups, associations, and non-state
institutions.90  For example, in England bodies such as the church, the
stock exchange, the legal profession, the insurance market, and even
the Jockey Club opted for forms of self-regulation that included
machinery for arbitrating disputes among their own members.91
Moreover, “private ‘closely knit’ homogenous micro-societies can
create their own norms that at times trump state law and at other times
fill lacunae in state regulation, but nonetheless operate
autonomously.”92  Finally, lawmaking authority over sports activity is
generally left to non-state entities (ranging from referees to doping
authorities) whose decisions are not usually reviewable except within
the system established by the sports authority or league93 or through
                                                                                                                 
communities: the Shakers, the Harmony Society, Oneida, and Zoar).  As Marc Galanter has
observed, the field of church and state is the “locus classicus of thinking about the
multiplicity of normative orders.”  Galanter, supra note 84, at 28.  See also Carol Weisbrod,
Family, Church and State: An Essay on Constitutionalism and Religious Authority, 26 J.
FAM. L. 741 (1988) (analyzing church-state relations in the United States from a pluralist
perspective).
89. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 43–49 (1968) (describing “implicit
law,” which includes everything from rules governing a camping trip among friends to the
customs of merchants).
90. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991) (drawing on an empirical study of relations among cattle ranchers to
develop a theory of nonlegal norms as a source of social control); Stewart Macaulay, Images
of Law in Everyday Life: The Lessons of School, Entertainment, and Spectator Sports, 21
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 185 (1987) (discussing the concept of legality as reflected in popular
culture); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28
AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963) (presenting empirical data on nonlegal dispute settlement in the
manufacturing industry); Stewart Macaulay, Popular Legal Culture: An Introduction, 98
YALE L.J. 1545 (1989) (surveying the sources of popular perceptions of the law).
91. See F.W. MAITLAND, Trust and Corporation, in MAITLAND: SELECTED ESSAYS 141,
189–95 (H.D. Hazeltine et al. eds., 1936) (1905) (describing the sophisticated non-legal
means of enforcing order among members of these institutions).
92. Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale
of Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 125 (2005).  See also, e.g., Amitai
Aviram, A Paradox of Spontaneous Formation: The Evolution of Private Legal Systems, 22
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2004) (using game theory to argue that the existence of pre-
existing networks enhances a private legal system’s ability to enforce norms); Lisa Bernstein,
Opting Out of the Legal System, 21 J. LEG. ST. 115 (1992) (discussing the system of “private
lawmaking” in the New York Diamond Dealers Club); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial
Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation through Rules, Norms and Institutions, 99
MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001).
93. See, e.g., Ga. High Sch. Ass’n v. Waddell, 285 S.E.2d 7, 9 (Ga. 1981) (holding that
a dispute over a referee’s decision affecting the outcome of a high school football game was
nonjusticiable).  But see PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 690 (2001) (ruling that a
golf association had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act by preventing a partially
disabled golfer from using a golf cart to compete); Bart Aronson, Pinstripes and Jailhouse
Stripes: The Case of “Athlete’s Immunity,” FindLaw Corporate Counsel Center (Nov. 3,
2000), at http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/aronson/20001103.html (criticizing the blanket
refusal to apply criminal law sanctions to athletes’ actions during sporting events).  For
further discussion of the “folk law of games or sports,” see Gordon Woodman, Introduction,
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international arbitral panels.94
Significantly, even if the jurisdiction of these non-state actors
is formally limited to the boundaries of the particular communities to
which they belong, the norms they articulate often seep into the
decisions of state legal institutions.  The most obvious example of
state law’s recognition of non-state lawmaking is in the common
law’s ongoing incorporation of social custom and practice.  As
scholars have recognized, “[d]ecisionmakers work under a continuing
pressure to incorporate customary rules into their decisions.”95
Sometimes such incorporation is explicit, as when a statute is
interpreted (or even supplanted) by reference to industry custom96 or
when a law of sales that would accord with merchant reality was
adopted in the Uniform Commercial Code.97  Even when the impact
of non-state norms is unacknowledged, state-sponsored law may only
be deemed legitimate to the extent that its official pronouncements
reflect the “common understandings of private laws and customs.”98
Indeed, the invention of legal fictions often indicates that official
norms are being adjusted to more closely reflect the dictates of non-
state norms and practices.
Thus, legal pluralists refuse to focus solely on who has the
formal authority to articulate norms or the coercive power to enforce
them.  Instead, they aim to study empirically which statements of
authority tend to be treated as binding in actual practice and by
whom.  On this view, “all collective behavior entailing systematic
understandings of our commitments to future worlds [can lay] equal
claim to the word ‘law.’”99  Accordingly, the nation-state is denied
any special status as a law-giver.  As Robert Cover has argued,
                                                                                                                 
in PEOPLE’S LAW AND STATE LAW: THE BELLAGIO PAPERS 18 (A. Allott & Gordon Woodman
eds., 1985).
94. See, e.g., James A.R. Nafziger, Dispute Resolution in the Arena of International
Sports Competition, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 161 (2002).
95. Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 87, at 330.
96. See, e.g., FULLER, supra note 89, at 57–59 (arguing that the act of interpretation
permits courts to adjust official legal norms to match custom or usage); JAMES WILLARD
HURST, LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE LUMBER INDUSTRY IN
WISCONSIN 1836–1915, at 289–94 (1964) (describing the ways in which local norms in the
Wisconsin lumber industry played a significant role in the way contract law was applied).
97. See Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the
Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465, 503–19 (1987) (describing Karl Llewellyn’s initial
drafts of what later became Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code).
98. Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 87, at 329.
99. ROBERT M. COVER, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, in NARRATIVE,
VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 173, 176 (Martha Minow et al.
eds., 1992) (footnote omitted).
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although
[S]uch “official” behavior and “official” norms is not
denied the dignity of “law” . . . it must share the
dignity with thousands of other social understandings.
In each case the question of what is law and for whom
is a question of fact about what certain communities
believe and with what commitments to those beliefs.100
Studies of the international legal order, therefore, must address the
interplay of a wide variety of normative commitments and law-giving
entities.
Taken together, these four inquiries point the way toward a
broader conception of how law operates in society and effects
consciousness in everyday life, apart from simply the official acts of
governmental institutions.  However, such sites of law have not
generally been emphasized in international law scholarship.  By
moving beyond an exclusive focus on formal governmental
institutions, therefore, the study of law and globalization opens up
new avenues of research and complicates understandings about the
interaction between official legal pronouncements and lived
experience.
B. Law Beyond Territorial Borders
International law scholars seeking to understand the changing
world in which legal rules operate would also do well to look beyond
their own academic disciplines (law and political science) to embrace
the vast literature in anthropology, sociology, critical geography, and
cultural studies concerning globalization.  This literature challenges
the idea of nation-states as the only relevant form of community
affiliation, rigorously questions the assumed naturalness of territorial
borders, and helps to reveal the more inchoate ways in which norms
are articulated and disseminated among multiple, often embedded,
communities.  As such, these scholars provide a more complicated
picture of the world than the top-down rules of international law
generally envision.
In the past two decades, for example, anthropologists and
sociologists have increasingly turned their attention to the myriad
questions of space, place, boundaries, diasporas, migrations, and
                                                
100. Id.
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cultural and economic “intertwinedness” of globalization.  And while
it is beyond the scope of this Article to summarize all of this work, it
may be useful to highlight some of the insights of this scholarship,
particularly concerning communities, cultures, and territorial
boundaries.
As many scholars have pointed out, the historical tendency has
been to connect the realm of meaning-construction processes with the
particularities of place.  Anthropology in fact had frequently been
premised on the idea that a world of human differences could be
conceptualized as a diversity of separate societies each with its own
culture.  This central assumption made it possible, beginning in the
early years of the Twentieth Century, to speak not only of “culture,”
but of “a culture.”  The implicit starting point was the presumed
existence of separate, individuated worldviews that could be
associated with particular “peoples,” “tribes,” or “nations.”101
This individuated conception of community, still so powerful
in legal discussions of the nation-state, no longer fits the
understanding of anthropologists or the practice of ethnography.  “In
place of such a world of separate, integrated cultural systems . . .
political economy has turned the anthropological gaze in the direction
of social and economic processes that connected even the most
isolated of local settings with a wider world.”102  As many
commentators have observed, cultural difference no longer can be
based on territory because of the mass migrations and transnational
culture flows of late capitalism.103  Thus, the task recently has been to
                                                
101. See Akhil Gupta & James Ferguson, Culture, Power, Place: Ethnography at the
End of an Era, in CULTURE, POWER, PLACE: EXPLORATIONS IN CRITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 1, 1
(1997) [hereinafter CULTURE, POWER, PLACE] (describing conceptions of “culture”); ULF
HANNERZ, TRANSNATIONAL CONNECTIONS: CULTURE, PEOPLE, PLACES 20 (1996) (“The idea
of an organic relationship between a population, a territory, a form as well as a unit of
political organization, and . . . cultures has . . . been an enormously successful one, spreading
throughout the world . . . at least as a guiding principle.”).  See also GEORGE W. STOCKING,
JR., RACE, CULTURE, AND EVOLUTION 202–03 (1968) (discussing Franz Boas’s influence in
defining “culture”).
102. Gupta & Ferguson, supra note 101, at 2.
103. See, e.g., Arjun Appadurai, Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural
Economy, in MODERNITY AT LARGE, supra note 72, at 27, 27–29, 33 (proposing a set of non-
territorial “scapes” to replace “landscapes” as fields of inquiry); HANNERZ, supra note 101, at
8 (“As people move with their meanings, and as meanings find ways of traveling even when
people stay put, territories cannot really contain cultures.”); Roger Friedland & Deirdre
Boden, NowHere: An Introduction to Space, Time and Modernity, in NOWHERE: SPACE, TIME
AND MODERNITY 1, 42 (Roger Friedland & Deirdre Boden eds., 1994) (“The circulation of
populations and symbols is progressively undercutting the essential relation between territory
and culture, the link between place and identity.”). See also JOHN TOMLINSON,
GLOBALIZATION AND CULTURE 106–49 (1999) (discussing the mundane ways in which
deterritorialization is experienced in everyday life).
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understand “the way that questions of identity and cultural difference
are spatialized in new ways.”104
Accordingly, anthropologists have argued that we live
increasingly in the “global cultural ecumene”105 of a “world in
creolization.”106  Similarly, sociologists have attempted to replace
their traditional emphasis on bounded “societies” with “a starting
point that concentrates upon analysing how social life is ordered
across time and space. . . .”107  In both disciplines, one can see
increasing efforts to explore the “intertwined processes of place
making and people making in the complex cultural politics of the
nation-state.”108
Nevertheless, the assumption that a culturally unitary group (a
“tribe” or a “people” or even a “citizenry”) is naturally tied to “its”
territory is difficult to shake because such assumptions are so deeply
ingrained in the modern consciousness.109  For example, as Akhil
Gupta and James Ferguson have pointed out, simply the fact that
contemporary maps refer to a collection of “countries” constructs a
picture of space as inherently fragmented along territorial lines, where
different colors correspond to different national societies, all of which
are made to seem fixed in place.110  Looking at such maps,
                                                
104. Gupta & Ferguson, supra note 101, at 3. See also AUSTIN SARAT & THOMAS R.
KEARNS, The Unsettled Status of Human Rights: An Introduction, in HUMAN RIGHTS:
CONCEPTS, CONTESTS, CONTINGENCIES 1, 13 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 2001)
(noting “a new understanding of culture in which an awareness of internal plurality,
fragmentation, and contestation replaces former tendencies to speak of cultures as . . . unified
wholes”).
105. Ulf Hannerz, Notes on the Global Ecumene, PUB. CULTURE, Spring 1989, at 66;
Robert J. Foster, Making National Cultures in the Global Ecumene, 20 ANN. REV.
ANTHROPOLOGY 235 (1991).  See also Appadurai, supra note 103, at 28 (arguing that “an
overlapping set of ecumenes [has begun] to emerge, in which congeries of money,
commerce, conquest, and migration . . . create durable cross-societal bonds”); Arjun
Appadurai & Carol A. Breckenridge, Editors’ Comments, PUB. CULTURE, Fall 1988, at 1, 1
(“[T]he emergent public cultures of many nation-states . . . constitute the centers of new
forms of cosmopolitanism in many linguistic and cultural ecumenes.”).
106. Ulf Hannerz, The World in Creolisation, 5 AFR. 546 (1987).
107. ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 64 (1990).
108. Gupta & Ferguson, supra note 101, at 4.  See also GIDDENS, supra note 107 (“[A]ll
associations of place, people, and culture are social and historical creations to be explained
[or justified], not given natural facts.”).
109. See Akhil Gupta & James Ferguson, Beyond “Culture”: Space, Identity, and the
Politics of Difference, in CULTURE, POWER, PLACE, supra note 101, at 33, 35 (challenging
“the national habit of taking the association of citizens of states and their territories as
natural”).
110. Id. at 34.  See also Richard T. Ford, Law’s Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97
MICH. L. REV. 843, 866–67 (1999) (linking the emergence of jurisdiction to the development
of cartography).
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“schoolchildren are taught such deceptively simple-sounding beliefs
as that France is where the French live, America is where the
Americans live, and so on.”111  Yet we all know that not only
Americans live in America and, of course, the very question of what
constitutes a “real American” is contested and variable.  Nonetheless,
“we assume a natural association of a culture (‘American culture’), a
people (‘Americans’), and a place (‘the United States of America’),”
and we therefore “present associations of people and place as solid,
commonsensical, and agreed on, when they are in fact contested,
uncertain, and in flux.”112  This naturalization of jurisdiction means
that “space itself becomes a kind of neutral grid on which cultural
difference, historical memory, and societal organization [are]
inscribed.”113  As a result, although the social and political
construction of space is a fundamental aspect of legal ordering, the
constructed nature of the enterprise disappears from analytical
purview.
Geographers, though they too historically tended to assume a
“natural” bond between a people, the land, and a set of legal
institutions,114 are also increasingly recognizing the power and politics
of the construction of space in society115 as well as the symbolic
                                                
111. Gupta & Ferguson, supra note 109, at 33, 40.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 34.
114. See, e.g., ELLEN CHURCHILL SEMPLE, INFLUENCES OF GEOGRAPHIC ENVIRONMENT 51
(1911) (“[H]uman activities are fully intelligible only in relation to the various geographic
conditions which have stimulated them in different parts of the world. . . . Therefore
anthropology, sociology, and history should be permeated by geography.”), reprinted in
FORMATIVE INFLUENCES OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENT 215, 216–17 (Albert Kocourek & John H.
Wigmore eds., 1918).
115. See NICHOLAS K. BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER 42
(1994) (“Recent geographic scholarship . . . has adopted what might be regarded as a
relational view of space.  Drawing on those such as Lefebvre, some theorists regard space as
both socially produced and as socially constitutive, and as deeply implicated in power
relations . . . .” (citation omitted)).  For examples of such critical geography, see JOHN A.
AGNEW, PLACE AND POLITICS: THE GEOGRAPHICAL MEDIATION OF STATE AND SOCIETY
(1987); CULTURAL ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENVIRONMENT: ENDURING AND EVOLVING
GEOGRAPHIC THEMES (Alexander B. Murphy & Douglas L. Johnson eds., 2000); ALLAN
PRED, MAKING HISTORIES AND CONSTRUCTING HUMAN GEOGRAPHIES (1990); ALLAN PRED &
MICHAEL JOHN WATTS, REWORKING MODERNITY: CAPITALISM AND SYMBOLIC DISCONTENT
(1992); EDWARD W. SOJA, POSTMODERN GEOGRAPHIES: THE REASSERTION OF SPACE IN
CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY (1989); WINICHAKUL THONGCHAI, SIAM MAPPED: A HISTORY OF
THE GEO-BODY OF A NATION (1994); Doreen Massey, Politics and Space/Time, NEW LEFT
REV., Nov.–Dec. 1992, at 65; Allan Pred, Place as Historically Contingent Process:
Structuration and the Time-Geography of Becoming Places, 74 ANNALS ASS’N AM.
GEOGRAPHERS 279 (1984); N.J. Thrift, On the Determination of Social Action in Space and
Time, 1 ENV’T & PLAN. D: SOC’Y & SPACE 23 (1983).
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significance of maps.116  Indeed, “[a]lthough the color map of the
political world displays a neat and ordered pattern of interlocking
units (with only a few lines of discord), it is not surprising that the
real world of national identities is one of blotches, blends, and
blurs.”117  First, many people inhabit border areas, where “[t]he fiction
of cultures as discrete, objectlike phenomena occupying discrete
spaces becomes implausible.”118  Such people may feel an affiliation
with the state controlling the area, the nation with which most
inhabitants identify, or the borderland itself.  Second, many others
live a life of border crossings : migrant workers, nomads, and
members of the transnational business and professional elite.  For
these people, it may be impossible to find a unified cultural identity.
Finally, many people cross borders on a relatively permanent basis,
including immigrants, refugees, exiles, and expatriates.  For them, the
disjuncture of place and culture is especially clear.  Immigrants
invariably transport their own culture with them to the new location
and, almost as invariably, shed certain aspects of that culture when
they come in contact with their new communities.  Diasporas
therefore are both “transnational” because members of a single
diaspora may live in many different countries, and “extremely
national” in their continued cultural and political loyalty to a
homeland.119  Indeed, by creating communities of interest rather than
                                                
116. See, e.g., THONGCHAI, supra note 115, at 129–30 (“[Mapping] became a lethal
instrument to concretize the projected desire on the earth’s surface. . . . A map anticipated a
spatial reality, not vice versa.  In other words, a map was a model for, rather than a model of,
what it purported to represent.”); Alan K. Henrikson, The Power and Politics of Maps, in
REORDERING THE WORLD: GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 49,
49 (George J. Demko & William B. Wood eds., 1994) (“To formulate a political plan,
diplomats must have a geographical conception, which requires the cartographic image of a
map.”).  Indeed, maps are often persuasive precisely because, though they always constitute
an attempt to portray the world in a specific way, the interests underlying that attempt tend to
remain unacknowledged.  See Diane M. Bolz, ‘Follow Me . . . I Am the Earth in the Palm of
Your Hand,’ SMITHSONIAN, Feb. 1993, at 112, 113 (“[Maps] are convincing because the
interest they serve is masked.”).  See generally DENIS WOOD, THE POWER OF MAPS 1 (1992)
(discussing the ability of maps to represent the past and the interests served in their creation).
In the thrall of such “cartohypnosis,” people “accept subconsciously and uncritically the ideas
that are suggested to them by maps.”  S.W. Boggs, Cartohypnosis, 15 DEP’T ST. BULL. 1119,
1119 (1946); Ford, supra note 110, at 856 (“[J]urisdiction is a function of its graphical and
verbal descriptions; it is a set of practices that are performed by individuals and groups who
learn to ‘dance the jurisdiction’ by reading descriptions of jurisdictions and by looking at
maps.”).
117. David H. Kaplan, Territorial Identities and Geographic Scale, in NESTED
IDENTITIES: NATIONALISM, TERRITORY, AND SCALE 31, 35 (Guntram H. Herb & David H.
Kaplan eds., 1999).
118. Gupta & Ferguson, supra note 109, at 34.
119. Kaplan, supra note 117, at 38.  See generally MODERN DIASPORAS IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (Gabriel Sheffer ed., 1986) (examining the influence of ethnic
diasporas on international and trans-state politics).
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place, diasporas (the number of which is increasing due largely to
labor immigration) pose an implicit threat to territorially based nation-
states.  In sum, we see that “[p]rocesses of migration, displacement
and deterritorialization are increasingly sundering the fixed
association between identity, culture, and place.”120
We also may feel the growing significance of “remote” forces
on our lives, whether those forces are multinational corporations,
global terrorist organizations, world capital markets or distant
bureaucracies such as the European Union.  The increased access to
media also affects deterritorialization because one is no longer limited
to the perspectives offered within one’s “home culture.”121  Thus, the
“typical” life of a suburban family in the United States may become
as familiar to world citizens inundated by American film and
television as their own “home” life.122  And, of course, those with less
power to influence the processes of globalization—those forced to
cross borders for work, those bankrupted through global competition,
those affected by environmental degradation, and many others—
experience this deterritorialization in even more insidious ways.
These ideas of space and community complicate the presumed
naturalness of nation-state communities.  The transformation of states
into nation-states requires that members of a sovereign entity come to
think of themselves not simply as subjects of governmental power but
as somehow bound to the other subjects within one community.
Benedict Anderson therefore has famously referred to nation-states as
“imagined communities”—“imagined because the members of even
the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members,
meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the
image of their communion.”123
This formulation does not imply that such imagined
communities are somehow “false” or “fabricated” in a negative
                                                
120. Akhil Gupta, The Song of the Nonaligned World: Transnational Identities and the
Reinscription of Space in Late Capitalism, in CULTURE, POWER, PLACE, supra note 101, at
179, 196.
121. See TOMLINSON, supra note 103, at 116 (describing the choice of perspectives
available through new media and the resultant overlaps between national and local
perspectives).
122. See id. at 119 (“For where are these places except in our cultural imagination, our
repertoire of ‘textual locations’ built up out of all the millions of images in films . . . we have
encountered?  And do we really require any of them to correspond all that closely with our
‘real’ locality?”).
123. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES 6 (rev. ed. 1991) (internal citation
omitted).  See also ERNEST GELLNER, THOUGHT AND CHANGE 168 (1964) (“Nationalism is not
the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not
exist . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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sense.124  Anderson argues that all communities larger than
“primordial villages” (and perhaps even those) are imagined.125  Thus,
nation-states are not illegitimate just because their inhabitants imagine
and construct psychological bonds of affiliation.  Nevertheless, the
fact that those bonds are constructed means that they are neither
natural nor inevitable; they are merely one particular way of
imagining community among many.  As such, we must turn our
attention to the ways in which conceptions of “community” are
constructed within social life, on how membership in a community is
marked and attributed, and on how notions of community are given
meaning.126  In doing so, we recognize that community formation is a
psychological process, not a naturally occurring phenomenon based
on external realities.127
Significantly, without this kind of expanded vision of
community there is no way to conceptualize a nation-state as a
                                                
124. Some commentators have a more negative view of the way in which nationalist
movements fabricate many of the “traditions” they purport to restore.  See, e.g., FRANCIS
FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 269 (1992) (noting the “deliberate
fabrications of nationalists, who had a degree of freedom in defining who or what constituted
a . . . nation”) (internal citation omitted); Anthony D. Smith, Introduction: Ethnicity and
Nationalism, in ETHNICITY AND NATIONALISM 1, 3 (Anthony D. Smith ed., 1992) (discussing
“modernist” theories of nationalism that rely on notions of “imagined community” and
“invented traditions”).
125. See ANDERSON, supra note 123, at 6 (suggesting that even communities
characterized by “face-to-face contact” are imagined).
126. See NIGEL RAPPORT & JOANNA OVERING, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY
62 (2000) (discussing modern anthropological views regarding community).  In a similar
vein, Gregory Bateson and Jürgen Ruesch argued that the relationship between “individual,”
“family,” “community,” “nation,” and world can best be understood through a study of the
social and psychological processes of human communication.  See GREGORY BATESON &
JÜRGEN RUESCH, COMMUNICATION: THE SOCIAL MATRIX OF PSYCHIATRY 5 (1951)
(“[C]ommunication is the only scientific model which enables us to explain physical,
intrapersonal, interpersonal, and cultural aspects of events within one system.”).  Likewise,
Fredrik Barth observed that social groups are not naturally joined as communities; they
achieve an identity by defining themselves as different from other groups and by erecting
boundaries between them.  See FREDRIK BARTH, Introduction to ETHNIC GROUPS AND
BOUNDARIES 9, 15 (Fredrik Barth ed., 1969) (“The boundaries to which we must give our
attention are of course social boundaries. . . .”).  Anthony Cohen extended Barth’s critique,
arguing that community must be seen as a symbolic construct, not a natural one.  See
ANTHONY P. COHEN, THE SYMBOLIC CONSTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY 14 (1985) (discussing
the “essentially symbolic nature of the idea of community itself”).  In Cohen’s vision,
community derives not from the type of external characteristics Redfield and others had
posited, but from internal perceptions of a boundary that separates one social group from
another.  Thus, communities and their boundaries exist not as geography but as “repositories
of meaning” in the minds of their members, and these socially constructed repositories of
meaning come to be expressed as a community’s distinctive social discourse.  Id. at 98.
127. See, e.g., Gupta & Ferguson, supra note 101, at 13 (arguing that “community” is “a
categorical identity that is premised on various forms of exclusion and constructions of
otherness”).
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community.  Yet at the same time, if communities are based not on
fixed attributes like geographical proximity, shared history, or face-
to-face interaction, but instead on symbolic identification and social
psychology, then there is no intrinsic reason to privilege nation-state
communities over other possible community identifications that
people might share.  Thus, the very same conception of community
upon which the nation-state relies also provides the basis for
critiquing the hegemony of the nation-state as the only relevant
community under discussion.  Such interdisciplinary insights
regarding questions of territory, boundaries, and community
definition help to de-center the state-based focus of international law.
C. Law Beyond the Public Law/Private Law Distinction
Law and globalization, because it looks beyond state-to-state
lawmaking, challenges the purported disciplinary distinction between
public and private international law.  This distinction, of course, has
long been problematic.  Canonically, public law consists “of
constitutional, administrative, criminal, and international law,
concerned with the organization of the state, the relations between the
state and the people who compose it, the responsibilities of public
officers to the state, to each other, and to private persons, and the
relations of states to one another.”128  Private law, in contrast, is
defined as “[t]hat portion of the law which defines, regulates,
enforces, and administers relationships among individuals,
associations, and corporations.”129  And building from this distinction,
two groups of scholarship have formed, often having seemingly little
to do with each other.  Thus, scholars of international business
transactions, or trade, or conflict of laws have had surprisingly little
overlap with those teaching and writing in the area of classic public
international law and international human rights.130
                                                
128. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1230 (6th ed. 1990).
129. Id. at 1196.
130. There are, of course, exceptions.  See, e.g., Adelle Blackett, Whither Social Clause?
Human Rights, Trade Theory and Treaty Interpretation, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 5
(1999)  (arguing that trade policy must be “situate[ed] . . .  within the system of public
international law”); Lan Cao, Corporate and Product Identity in the Postnational Economy:
Rethinking U.S. Trade Laws, 90 CAL. L. REV. 401 (2002) (arguing that country-of-origin
designations in US trade laws perpetuate “this chimera of nationality in a world of
internationality”); Sara Dillon, A Farewell to “Linkage”: International Trade Law and
Global Sustainability Indicators, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 87 (2002) (drawing on the
international human rights literature to suggest reforms of traditional conceptions of
international trade).
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Yet, the public/private distinction in international law is
difficult to maintain in light of the extensive critique of all
public/private distinctions that has been mounted by legal realists,131
critical legal studies scholars,132 and feminist theorists.133  As Robert
Post has pointed out, “legal realists relentlessly demonstrated that
rules of ‘private’ property actually structured social relations and thus
were subject to evaluation in terms of the social structures they
                                                
131. See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. REV. 8 (1927)
(describing the public/private distinction in the context of property (as public) and
sovereignty (as private)); Robert L. Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison of “Political”
and “Economic” Compulsion, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 149 (1935) (comparing public “political
power” with forms of privately wielded power).
132. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Stages in the Decline of the Public/Private
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1349 (1982) (“The history of legal thought since the
turn of the century is the history of the decline of a particular set of distinctions . . .
state/society, public/private, individual/group, right/power, property/sovereignty,
contract/tort, law/policy, legislature/judiciary, objective/subjective, reason/fiat, [and]
freedom/coercion.”).  For example, Frances Olsen has argued that:
Both laissez faire and nonintervention in the family are false ideals.  As long as
a state exists and enforces any laws at all, it makes political choices.  The state
cannot be neutral or remain uninvolved, nor would anyone want the state to do
so.  The staunchest supporters of laissez faire always insisted that the state
protect their property interests and that courts enforce contracts and adjudicate
torts.  They took this state action for granted and chose not to consider such
protection a form of state intervention.  Yet the so-called “free market” does not
function except for such laws; the free market could not exist independently of
the state.  The enforcement of property, tort, and contract law requires constant
political choices that may benefit one economic actor, usually at the expense of
another.  As Robert Hale pointed out more than a half century ago, these legal
decisions “are bound to affect the distribution of income and the direction of
economic activities.”  Any choice the courts make will affect the market, and
there is seldom any meaningful way to label one choice intervention and the
other laissez faire.  When the state enforces any of these laws it must make
political decisions that affect society.
Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
835, 836–37 (1985) (citation omitted).
133. For example, feminists have long argued that, as a result of the artificial line drawn
between the public and private sphere, certain gender-specific issues have been left out of the
human rights arena.  See generally Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to
International Law, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 613, 614 (1991) (“In this article we question the
immunity of international law to feminist analysis—why has gender not been an issue in this
discipline?—and indicate the possibilities of feminist scholarship in international law.”).  See
also, e.g., Karen Engle, After the Collapse of the Public/Private Distinction: Strategizing
Women’s Rights, in RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 143. 143
(Dorinda Dallmeyer ed., 1993) (“Over the last fifteen years, women’s rights advocates—
generally feminists of one stripe or another—have staged a multitiered critique of public
international law, focusing largely on its exclusion of women.”); Celina Romany, Women as
Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights
Law, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 87 (1993) (“Women are subjects of a system of familial terror
with diverse modalities of violence, yet human rights discourse has been inaccessible to
women.”); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973 (1991)
(describing how battering in discourse has been consistently considered a “private” issue
rather than a “public” one).
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created.”134  From this perspective, government is always in the
background, creating and enforcing the rules of property, contract,
tort, employment, and so on.  These rules inevitably regulate social
life by establishing and maintaining the type of “private” relationships
deemed appropriate or desirable.  And of course, such regulation is
always directed toward the achievement of public goals.
Accordingly, Post argues, “[a]ll private law . . . ultimately involves
‘the relations between the state and the people who compose it.’”135
Moreover, the boundary between public and private
international law, though often treated as distinct, has been blurred
from its inception.  When Jeremy Bentham first coined the phrase
“inter-national law,” thereby placing the public law of nations in its
own category, “deep interpenetration of domestic and international
systems and strong blending of public and private remained key
features of the legal system.”136  For example, Blackstone’s
Commentaries declared that the common law fully internalized the
law of nations, which Blackstone described as “a system of rules,
deducible by natural reason and established by universal consent
among the civilized inhabitants of the world . . . to insure the
observance of justice and good faith, in that intercourse which must
frequently occur between two or more independent states, and the
individuals belonging to each.”137
The shift in focus from international law to law and
globalization provides a new impetus for erasing the artificial
boundary between public and private in international law.  As Ralph
Steinhardt pointed out over a decade ago, “the concerns, the actors,
and the processes of ‘public’ international law have been expanded—
’privatized’—in this century.”138  Thus, conflicts law and international
business transactions have become a staple of state-to-state relations,
and non-state or private actors have taken an increasingly important
role in the articulation and enforcement of international standards.139
                                                
134. See Robert Post, The Challenge of Globalization to American Public Law
Scholarship, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 323, 324 (2001).
135. Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1230 (6th ed.1990)).
136. Koh, supra note 3, at 2609.
137. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 66 (emphasis added).  And, as Mark Janis
notes, Blackstone is the more reliable reporter on actual practice because while Bentham was
attempting mostly to reform the law, Blackstone was more focused on restating it.  See M.W.
Janis, Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioning of “International Law,” 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 405,
410 n.31 (1984).
138. Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Privatization of Public Law, 25 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. &
ECON. 523, 544 (1991).
139. Id. at 543.  See also, e.g., CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 13, at 19–20 (“The
distinctions between public and private international law have become increasingly artificial
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For example, just as in traditional public law areas such as
human rights, we are witnessing in private international law the
proliferation of international tribunals.  Thus, commentators have
noted the increasing role of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
appellate tribunals in creating an international common law of
trade,140 as well as the new prominence of other specialized trade
courts developed in connection with free trade agreements.141  These
courts are amassing a body of legal rules that in many cases challenge
traditional prerogatives of nation-state sovereignty and may override
domestic court decisions,142 or at least act in dialectical relationship
with national courts.143  In addition, again as in the public law context,
non-governmental organizations and international civil society groups
are becoming increasingly active in the WTO process, attempting to
use the appellate panels to further the aims of environmental or labor
movements.144
Moreover, though only state parties can be the formal litigants
in the WTO dispute resolution process, other free trade panels permit
private parties to challenge domestic governmental regulations
                                                                                                                 
as many states and their instrumentalities have entered the marketplace in a major way . . .
and as commerce and foreign policy have become increasingly intertwined.”).
140. See, e.g., Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis and International Trade Law
(Part One of a Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 845, 850 (1999) (“In brief, there is a body
of international common law on trade emerging as a result of adjudication by the WTO’s
Appellate Body.  We have yet to recognize, much less account for, this reality in our
doctrinal thinking and discussions.”).
141. See, e.g., Homer E. Moyer, Chapter 19 of the NAFTA: Binational Panels as the
Trade Courts of Last Resort, 27 INT’L LAW. 707 (1993) (describing the emergence of a
binational panel process stemming from Chapter 19 of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA)).
142. See generally William J. Davey, Has the WTO Dispute Settlement System Exceeded
Its Authority?, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 79 (2001).  See also CLAUDE E. BARFIELD, FREE TRADE,
SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY: THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 9 (2001)
(expressing concern that expansive judicial lawmaking at the WTO might diminish U.S.
sovereignty); Lori M. Wallach, Accountable Governance in the Era of Globalization: The
WTO, NAFTA and International Harmonization of Standards, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 823, 825
(2002) (“Expansive international rules strongly enforced through international dispute
resolution bodies have significant implications for the laws and policies domestic
governments may establish, as well as for the processes domestic governments use to make
policy.”).
143. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: International Review of
National Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029 (2004) (arguing that NAFTA tribunals and U.S.
state courts operate in dialectical relationship to each other).
144. See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Theories of Justice, Human Rights and the
Constitution of International Markets, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 407, 455 (2003) (“[T]he
increasing ‘global justice campaigns’ by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which
influence international rule-making ever more actively (e.g., on the International Criminal
Court, environmental agreements, WTO negotiations), illustrate the emergence of a new
international ‘civil society.’”).
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directly.145  In addition, a number of international conventions, though
signed by state parties, empower private actors to develop
international norms.  For example, the Convention on the Settlement
of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States
permits private creditors to sue debtor states in an international
forum.146  Similarly, the convention on the international sale of goods
allows transacting parties to opt out of any nation-state law and
instead choose a sort of “merchant law” reminiscent of the feudal
era’s lex mercatoria.147  And of course, international trade association
groups and their private standard-setting bodies wield a tremendous
influence in creating voluntary standards that become industry
norms.148  Such norms often have strong public policy
                                                
145. For example, under NAFTA’s Chapter 11, private investors have standing to
challenge a NAFTA government’s regulatory decisions.  See Greg Block, Trade and
Environment in the Western Hemisphere: Expanding the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation in the Americas, 33 ENVTL. L. 501, 507 (2003) (“NAFTA’s
Chapter 11 establishes rules pertaining to investments and investors, including a dispute
settlement mechanism allowing private investors to challenge NAFTA governments directly
for breach of the investment provisions of Chapter 11.”).  For an argument that non-
governmental organizations (including business groups) should be granted formal WTO
standing, see, for example, Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental
Organizations in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 331 (1996), and
G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the
World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829 (1995).
146. See ARON BROCHES, SELECTED ESSAYS: WORLD BANK, ICSID, AND OTHER
SUBJECTS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 198 (1995) (observing that the
Convention “firmly establishes the capacity of a private individual or a corporation to
proceed directly against a State in an international forum, thus contributing to the growing
recognition of the individual as a subject of international law.”); IGNAZ SEIDL-
HOHENVELDERN, COLLECTED ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS AND ON
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 374 (1998) (noting that the “Convention attempts to
encourage foreign investors to invest in developing countries by granting to them, in case of a
dispute with the host country, a status equal to that enjoyed by that State.”).  See generally G.
Richard Shell, The Trade Stakeholders Model and Participation by Nonstate Parties in the
World Trade Organization, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 703, 715 (2004) (discussing private
party participation in dispute settlements before the ICSID and the International Labor
Organization).
147. See, e.g., Clayton Gillette, The Law Merchant in the Modern Age: Institutional
Design and International Usages Under the CISG, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 157, 159 (2004) (noting
that the Convention “explicitly incorporates trade usages into contracts that it governs,
permits usages to trump conflicting [Convention] provisions, and authorizes courts to
interpret and complete contracts by reference to usages.”).  But see Celia Wasserstein
Fassberg, Lex Mercatoria—Hoist with Its Own Petard?, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 67 (2004) (arguing
that the modern revival of lex mercatoria departs significantly from the historical
conception).
148. For example, the Fair Labor Association (formerly the Apparel Industry
Partnership) has created the standards now accepted as the norm in the apparel industry.  See
Workplace Code of Conduct and Principles of Monitoring, Fair Labor Ass’n, at
http://www.fairlabor.org/html/CodeofConduct (providing a “set of standards defining decent
and humane working conditions).  Likewise, in the chemical industry, groups such as the
Canadian Chemical Manufacturers Association and the International Counsel of Chemical
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ramifications.149  In sum, as Michael Reisman has pointed out, the
term “private” in “private international law” is a “misnomer, for what
is transpiring is a fundamental interstate competition for power that
falls squarely within the province of public international law.”150
Thus, the distinction between state policy and private agreement,
though always problematic, seems increasingly irrelevant.
D. Law Beyond Sovereignty
Finally, a focus on law and globalization may allow
international law scholars to move beyond debilitating assumptions
and polarizing debates about nation-state sovereignty.  Sovereignty is,
of course, a notoriously difficult word to analyze (or even define).
Yet, the previous three sections, taken together, at least suggest that
the classic Nineteenth-Century conception of sovereignty may be
outmoded:
[This was] an order in which the state was the only
player, and the need to protect its sovereignty was
paramount.  There were relatively few rules of
international law—and certainly no rules protecting
                                                                                                                 
Associations (ICCA) have set industry standards in conjunction with other NGOs and
environmental organizations such as Greenpeace.  See Lee A. Tavis, Corporate Governance
and the Global Social Void, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 487, 508–09 (2002) (“This [standard
setting] reflects a complicated inter-relationship among the members of a private sector
regime (ICCA), and other non-governmental organisations (Greenpeace), and governmental
institutions (IFCS and individual governments).”) (internal quotations omitted).
149. For example, in the wake of the scandal surrounding Enron Corporation, the
governmental reforms incorporated into the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204,
116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.), received most
of the attention, but changes involving the way corporate debt is rated by Moody’s and
Standard & Poor’s (both private corporations) may be even more significant over the long
term.  See Jenny Wiggins, Enron—Wall Street and regulators; S&P outlines ratings overhaul
in light of Enron, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2002, available at
http://specials.ft.com/enron/FT3DYSSOWWC.html (discussing changes in U.S. corporate
governance and debt rating in the post–Enron world).  See also Troy A. Paredes, After The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act: The Future of The Mandatory Disclosure System, 81 WASH. U. L.Q.
229, 236 (2003) (noting that “Institutional Shareholder Services, GovernanceMetrics
International, Standard & Poor’s, and others have started grading the corporate governance
structures of companies, just as Standard & Poor’s or Moody’s grade their debt”).  Likewise,
while international labor standards are difficult to establish at the governmental level, several
private companies in the apparel industry, responding to calls for global responsibility and
the setting of norms, have adopted codes of conduct and participated in the United Nations’
Global Compact.  See Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, Enforcing International Labor Standards:
The Potential of the Alien Tort Claims Act, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 203, 207 (2004)
(noting this phenomenon but discussing difficulties in holding private corporations to such
codes).
150. REISMAN, supra note 4, at i.
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fundamental human rights or the environment which
could be invoked to override immunity or to claim an
interest in activities beyond a state’s territory.151
As discussed above, the premises of this conception are all being
reconsidered.  Thus, an emphasis on legal consciousness, pluralism,
and law beyond official governmental institutions exposes processes
of normative development that are not beholden to the edicts of
nation-states.  Likewise, the permeability of borders and the fluidity
of community affiliations challenge ideas of inviolate nation-state
sovereignty.  And the erosion of the distinction between public and
private international law undermines the privileged place of nation-
states as the only players in the public international law arena.  It is
not surprising then that, over the past fifteen years, many international
law theorists have shifted their attention to the variety of ways in
which the prerogatives of nation-state sovereignty may be affected
(and limited) by norms articulated, disseminated, and enforced
transnationally or internationally.152
                                                
151. Sands, supra note 8, at 529.  See also Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877)
(“[E]very State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property
within its territory [and] . . . no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over
persons or property without its territory.”) (citing JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS, ch. 2 (1869)).
152. See, e.g., MATTHEW HORSMAN & ANDREW MARSHALL, AFTER THE NATION-STATE:
CITIZENS, TRIBALISM AND THE NEW WORLD DISORDER, ix (1994) (“The traditional nation-
state, the fruit of centuries of political, social and economic evolution, is under threat.”);
George J. Demko & William B. Wood, Introduction: International Relations Through the
Prism of Geography, in REORDERING THE WORLD: GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 3, 10 (George J. Demko & William B. Wood eds., 1994) (“Once
sacrosanct, the concept of a state’s sovereignty—the immutability of its international
boundaries—is now under serious threat.”); KENICHI OHMAE, THE END OF THE NATION STATE,
viii (1995) (suggesting that the practice of liberal democracy in the West and the notion of
national sovereignty are being called into question by globalization); Steve Charnovitz, WTO
Cosmopolitics, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 299, 306–07 (2002) (arguing that the “ortho-
politics” model of the sovereign state system is of declining relevance for World Trade
Organization policy analysis and should be replaced by a “cosmopolitics” of direct
participation by nonstate actors); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order,
FOREIGN AFF. (Sept./Oct. 1997), at 184–86 (arguing that “[t]he state is not disappearing, it is
disaggregating”); Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the Foreign Affairs Constitution, 63 OHIO
ST. L.J. 649, 667–73 (2002) (arguing that the decentralization of governmental structures and
activity is undermining sovereignty and the state system); Ruti G. Teitel, Humanity’s Law:
Rule of Law for the New Global Politics, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 355, 363–65 (2002) (arguing
that international institutions are increasingly the source of norms previously supplied by
states).  See also, e.g., SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL?  SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION (1996); Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 HARV. J.
INT’L L. 303 (2004); John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated
Concept, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 782, 786 (2003);  Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power
in a Networked World Order, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 283 (2004) [hereinafter Slaughter,
Sovereignty and Power]; Phillip R. Trimble, Globalization, International Institutions, and the
Erosion of National Sovereignty and Democracy, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1944, 1969 (1997) (book
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Significantly, the classic conception of inviolate nation-state
sovereignty has been attacked by scholars with very different
ideological and theoretical commitments.  For example, international
law triumphalists, such as Louis Henkin, have complained for years
that talk of sovereignty “pollutes” the air because “[g]overnments
raise iron curtains of ‘sovereignty’ to resist international cooperation
and frustrate international norms and institutions, to conceal atrocities
behind state boundaries, to prevent their investigation and discovery,
to preclude judgment and condemnation under international law, and
reaction by international institutions.”153  Such a conception of nation-
state sovereignty, according to Henkin, is not just misguided, but
historically inaccurate as well, because sovereignty is an internal
concept, related only to the source of legitimate authority within a
state.  Thus, sovereignty is not “per se a normative conception in
international law.”154  Instead, Henkin contends that universal human
values have displaced state values at the core of international law.
Political scientist Stephen Krasner, though starting from an
international relations realist perspective, agrees with Henkin that
conceptions of inviolate nation-state sovereignty are ahistorical.155
Indeed, Krasner goes so far as to claim that international law
principles of state sovereignty have never provided powerful checks
on the behavior of nation-states.156  Rather, according to Krasner,
though there has been much talk about sovereignty over the past two
hundred years, such talk has not been a significant limitation on the
ability of powerful rulers to violate sovereignty principles when it was
in their interest to do so.157  Yet, though he eschews notions of
inviolate nation-state sovereignty, Krasner, unlike Henkin, still
locates the state at the center of all international relations.  Indeed,
whereas Henkin rejects nation-state sovereignty because he sees it as
aggrandizing state power at the expense of international or universal
norms, Krasner views sovereignty as a purported (and historically
ineffectual) limitation on states’ power to intervene in each other’s
                                                                                                                 
review).
153. Louis Henkin, The Mythology of Sovereignty, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. NEWSL., Mar.
1993, at 1.
154. Id. at 6.  See also Henkin, supra note 4, at 31 (“‘[S]overeignty’ is a mistake, indeed
a mistake built upon mistakes, which has barnacled an unfortunate mythology.”).
155. See generally STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999).
156. Id. at 24 (“[T]he most important empirical conclusion of the present study is that the
principles associated with both Westphalian and international legal sovereignty have always
been violated.”).
157. See id. (arguing that sovereignty is best understood as “organized hypocrisy” in that
rulers adhere to conventional norms and principles only when it is in their interests to do so).
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affairs.  Krasner assumes that the self-interested acts of national rulers
are the principal determinants of state behavior and that, therefore,
international law norms (including norms about inviolate nation-state
sovereignty) are always necessarily a set of tools serving the
instrumental aims of the powerful.158
Finally, scholars taking a postmodern perspective likewise
challenge the idea of unfettered nation-state sovereignty, even though
they reject both the triumphalist and instrumentalist views.159  Such
“constructivists” emphasize that states are always the products of
cultural and interpretive systems.160  Thus, the interests of nation-
states are not simply pre-existing givens to be pursued, but are
themselves shaped by a variety of forces, including the norms and
institutions of international law itself.161  “Through processes of social
learning and persuasion, actors ‘internalize’ new norms and rules of
appropriate behavior and redefine their interests and identities
accordingly.”162  In this conception, the state is embedded in a wider
institutional environment, and governmental and non-governmental
actors alike are part of the feedback loop that both constructs and
responds to non-national norms.
While the Nineteenth-Century vision of the sovereign nation-
state (to the extent it actually existed) has therefore been challenged
from all sides, the resulting debates have too often devolved into a
perceived dichotomy between the imperatives of “international law”
on the one hand and the importance of “nation-state sovereignty” on
the other.  For some, the post-Cold War era has represented a new
moment of international and transnational activity in both public and
private international law that sharply curtailed the prerogatives of
nation-states.163  For others, the idea of such a “transnational
                                                
158. Id. at 7 (“Rulers, not states—and not the international system—make choices about
policies, rules, and institutions.”).  See also GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 14 (espousing
a similar view).  But see supra note 14 (challenging this view).
159. See generally ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
(1999); Jeffrey T. Checkel, The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory, 50
WORLD POL. 324 (1998) (reviewing books taking constructivist approach); James G. March
& Johan P. Olsen, The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders, 52 INT’L
ORG. 943 (1998).
160. See, e.g., GABRIEL A. ALMOND & SIDNEY VERBA, THE CIVIC CULTURE (1963);
Pierre Bourdieu, Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field, in
STATE/CULTURE: STATE FORMATION AFTER THE CULTURAL TURN 53 (George Steinmetz ed.,
1999).
161. See, e.g., THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC
CHANGE (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 1999).
162. Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1749, 1752 (2003).
163. See, e.g., Sands, supra note 8.
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moment”164 was overblown from the start and, in any event, has faded
into a pre-9/11 past, leaving nation-state sovereignty once again in its
rightful place at the core of the international order. 165
Such a dichotomy seems too schematic, obscuring the
complicated and multifaceted set of ideas captured in the word
“sovereignty”166 and ignoring the dynamic process of international
and transnational norm development.  Accordingly, the globalization
debate about the changing nature of sovereignty must progress
beyond the polarizing question of whether the Westphalian system of
sovereign nation-states is dying or not.  Instead, scholars and political
theorists can turn their attention to the ways in which sovereignty
might be changing in a world of interlocking governance structures
and systems of communication.  While nation-states may not
disappear, their sovereignty may well become diffused in order to
accommodate various international, transnational, or non-territorial
norms.167  Thus, scholars must continue to travel the path blazed by
Abram and Antonia Chayes, who argued that the “new sovereignty”
involves nation-state participation in a wide range of international and
transgovernmental regimes, networks, and institutions, all of which
                                                
164. See Khachig Tölölyan, Rethinking Diaspora(s): Stateless Power in the
Transnational Moment, 5 DIASPORA 3 (1996).
165. See, e.g., Dominique Moïsi, Early Winners and Losers in a Time of War, FIN. TIMES
(U.S. ed.), Nov. 19, 2001, at 15 (“In the post-cold-war global age, the state’s legitimacy and
competence appeared to be waning. Caught between the emergence of civil society and the
growing power of transnational corporations, the state appeared to be fighting a rearguard
battle. Now, with security a priority, it is back with a vengeance.”).
166. For example, Stephen Krasner identifies four different conceptions of sovereignty.
See KRASNER, supra note 155, at 9–25.  First, there is Westphalian sovereignty, which, in
Krasner’s scheme, roughly corresponds to the international law principle of territorial
sovereignty.  This is a political organization based on “the exclusion of external actors from
domestic authority structures.”  Id. at 20.  Second, he identifies international legal
sovereignty, which is defined as “the practices associated with mutual recognition, usually
between territorial entities that have formal judicial independence.”  Id. at 3.  This notion of
sovereignty concerns international law principles mandating various forms of mutual respect
for other sovereign entities.  Third, domestic sovereignty concerns the ability of the political
authority of a state to exercise coercive power within its own borders.  See id. at 4.  And
fourth, interdependence sovereignty implicates “the ability of public authorities to regulate
the flow of information, ideas, goods, people, pollutants, or capital across the borders of their
state.”  Id.
167. See, e.g., REISMAN, supra note 4, at xxi (“If the so-called globalization of many
sectors of the economy does not . . . signal the end of the state, it certainly does signal an
exacerbated identity crisis.”); Hannah L. Buxbaum, Conflict of Economic Laws: From
Sovereignty to Substance, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 931, 942–54 (2002) (discussing ways in which
“regulatory power traditionally enjoyed by sovereign states has shifted” to the supranational
level, to private actors, and to “informal networks constituted among sub state-level agencies
in different countries”); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power, supra note 152, at
288 (“[T]he state is not losing power so much as changing the way that it exercises its
power.”).
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have become necessary for governments to accomplish what they
once could do on their own within a defined territory.168
Indeed, if we assume that nation-states will remain active
players in the world of power politics, the challenge for scholars is to
extend the Chayes’ vision by developing yet further possibilities for
understanding sovereignty.  Such revolutions in conceptions of
sovereignty have, according to Daniel Philpott, historically resulted
from “revolutions in ideas about justice and political authority.”169
This is because revolutions in ideas bring about what Philpott calls
“crises of pluralism.”170  If this analysis is correct, then it is not
surprising that scholars are gravitating to those areas where the reality
of human interaction, with its plural sources of norms, seems to be
chafing against the strictures traditional conceptions of sovereignty
impose.
For example, those studying legal issues involving online
communication have attempted to reinvigorate long-running debates
about how a territorially-based system of sovereignty should regulate
activity that so easily crosses geographical boundaries.171  Because
online transactions often involve participants in widely dispersed
physical locations, multiple sovereignties frequently attempt to assert
conflicting normative orders over the same activity, arguably leading
to “crises of pluralism” (or at least challenges to jurisdictional
schemes based on territory).172  Likewise, the growth of transnational
corporate activity has renewed interest in the feudal idea of lex
mercatoria and other plural forms of law that operate outside the
nation-state system.173  Some have even suggested systems in which
                                                
168. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 4 (1995).
169. DANIEL PHILPOTT, REVOLUTIONS IN SOVEREIGNTY: HOW IDEAS SHAPED MODERN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 4 (2001).
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV.
311 (2002); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); Joel P. Trachtman, Cyberspace, Sovereignty,
Jurisdiction, and Modernism, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 561, 562 (1998).
172. See Berman, supra note 171, at 327–66 (outlining these various challenges to
territorial conceptions of jurisdiction).
173. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A
Model of Decentralized Law, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 215, 216–17 (1994); Richard
Epstein, The Empirical And Theoretical Underpinnings of the Law Merchant, 5 CHI. J. INT’L
L. 1 (2004); Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the
Maghribi Traders, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 857 (1989); Avner Greif, Institutions and Impersonal
Exchange: The European Experience (May 2004) (Stanford Law School, John M. Olin
Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 284, 2004), available at
http://www.ssrn.com (last visited July 15, 2004); Avner Greif et al., Coordination,
Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild, 102 J. POL. ECON. 745
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companies could choose among the laws of various nation-states to
determine the applicable norms of securities174 or bankruptcy175
regulation.  Meanwhile, international human rights lawyers and
scholars have continued to explore expanded conceptions of criminal
jurisdiction that are less dependent on territorial borders or the
prerogatives of nation-state sovereignty.176  Still others have attempted
to articulate theories of sovereignty based on the sociology of
institutions in order to study how pluralist processes of norm
inculcation might operate in actual practice.177
While all of these efforts offer promising avenues for research,
it is possible that the rubric of sovereignty itself may unduly limit our
ability to think creatively about the way law operates in an
interconnected world.  After all, at root level sovereignty is almost
always premised on coercive power:  who has it, who can exercise it,
who can rightfully claim it.  But the changing structures of norm
development and inter-penetration we see around us do not always
rely on coercive power.  Rather, we see various forms of rhetorical
persuasion, informal articulations of legal norms, and networks of
affiliation that may not possess literal enforcement power.  As a
result, the study of law and globalization invokes not only the
diffusion of norms across territorial borders, but also the fact that
legal articulations often cross the supposed conceptual border
between “official” law on the one hand, and political rhetoric or non-
official legal pronouncements on the other.  Holding onto a fixed
dividing line between the two may prevent us from seeing the broader
ways in which legal norms develop and spread.  Transnationalism
frequently involves the articulation of legal norms even without the
literal power to enforce those norms.  Yet, the mere articulation of
such norms may often have important, though less obvious,
persuasive power.
                                                                                                                 
(1994); Gillian Hadfield, Privatizing Commercial Law, REG. 40, 41–42 (2001); Paul Milgrom
et al., The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges,
and the Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1 (1990).  See also supra notes 145–149 and
accompanying text; REISMAN, supra note 4, at xii (noting that “[c]oupled with the growth of
lex mercatoria, modern arbitration has, in many economic sectors, removed the issue of
legislative conflicts of jurisdiction from states and assigned them to a network of private
tribunals”).
174. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality
of American Securities Law, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 207, 231–33 (1996) (discussing the
principle of “portable reciprocity”).
175. See, e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies, 19
MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (1997).
176. See supra note 9.
177. See, e.g., Goodman & Jinks, supra note 162.
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Because sovereignty may not be a capacious enough idea to
capture such rhetorical processes, it may ultimately be an unhelpful
concept for understanding these forms of norm development and
governance, even after the simplistic classical notion of inviolate state
prerogatives has been removed from the scene.  In the end, scholars
may need to move “beyond sovereignty” and construct new tropes for
analyzing law in a global era.
II. LAW AND GLOBALIZATION: TEN AREAS OF STUDY
If it is true that scholars in international law and related
disciplines have been, over the past fifteen years, staking out a new
field of study, what are the contours of this more comprehensive
approach?  Having broadened the traditional international law focus
to include legal scholarship in other areas as well as a range of legal
and interdisciplinary work far beyond the traditional emphasis on
state-to-state relations, treaties, and other formal international
instruments, scholars are left to define a new set of conceptual
inquiries that constitute the study of law and globalization.  There
undoubtedly are many such new theoretical inquiries, and more will
be developed over time.  But here are some themes that I see being
played out in this emerging field.
A. Jurisdictional Rules and the Problem of Physical Location
Increased interaction across territorial borders has brought to
the fore many complicated questions about legal jurisdiction—both
civil and criminal—along with their often-related choice-of-law
issues.  Historically, international law scholars have tended to analyze
questions of jurisdiction by reference to physical location.  Yet
physical location seems increasingly unimportant as a way of
determining whether a given act or actor should fall within the
dominion of a particular community.  As a result, we see courts
around the world struggling to develop jurisdictional models to
account for the fact that people enter relationships and cause harms
without regard to the territorial boundaries of the Westphalian nation-
state system.  And, because jurisdiction may be asserted in one
physical location over activities or parties located in a different
physical location, the issue of jurisdiction is deeply enmeshed with
precisely the fixed conception of territorial boundaries that
contemporary events are challenging.
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The problem, of course, is that local communities are now far
more likely to be affected by activities and entities with no local
presence.  Cross-border interaction obviously is not a new
phenomenon, but in an electronically connected world the effects of
any given action may immediately be felt elsewhere with no
relationship to physical geography at all.  Thus, although it is not
surprising that local communities might feel the need to apply their
norms to extraterritorial activities based simply on the local harms
such activities cause, assertions of jurisdiction on this basis will
almost inevitably tend toward a system of universal jurisdiction
because so many activities will have effects far beyond their
immediate geographical boundaries.  Such a system, for better or
worse, would jettison any idea that the application of legal norms to a
party depends in some way on the party’s having consented to be
governed by those norms.178  Even more importantly, while courts,
policy makers, and scholars are scrambling simply to adapt existing
jurisdictional models to the new social context in order to “solve”
these tensions in particular situations, they are doing so without
giving sufficient consideration to the theoretical basis for the exercise
of legal jurisdiction in an increasingly interconnected world.
A focus on law and globalization, in contrast, can open up new
avenues for discussion by emphasizing forms of community
affiliation that may not be tied to the physical location of a particular
person or object.  Such scholarship may explore ways in which
conceptions of legal jurisdiction and choice of law become the locus
for debates both about community definition and related ideas about
space, distance, and identity.  And while contemporary frameworks
for thinking about jurisdictional authority often unreflectively accept
the assumption that nation-states defined by fixed territorial borders
are the only relevant jurisdictional entities, scholars of law and
globalization can study how people actually experience allegiance to
community or understand their relationship to geographical distance
and territorial borders.
The present historical moment provides an opportunity to ask
such questions.  The twin forces of increasing globalization more
generally, and the rise of the internet particularly, have posed
challenges—not necessarily unsolvable challenges—but challenges
nonetheless, and jurisdictional schemes based on territorial
boundaries have had difficulty coping with such challenges.  From
                                                
178. Cf. REISMAN, supra note 4, at xvii (noting that an effects theory of jurisdiction “is
little more than a restatement of the essential problem that gives rise to the part of the law
known as international “jurisdiction”).
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concerns over extraterritorial content regulations,179 trademark
rules,180 taxation schemes,181 and criminal investigations182 regarding
internet transactions, to controversies surrounding universal and
transnational criminal jurisdiction for human rights violations,183 to
arguments about the legitimacy of various international tribunals184 to
the U.S. government’s assertion185 (now rejected by the U.S. Supreme
Court186) that the U.S. military base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba was
not within the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, we see similar questions of
jurisdiction arising again and again.  And, instead of continuing to
invoke such old criteria for jurisdiction as the physical presence of
people or things in a geographical location, law and globalization
scholars should be at the forefront of thinking about how communities
are appropriately defined in today’s world and whether there might be
new ways of delimiting the scope of legal jurisdiction187 or developing
hybrid jurisdictional188 or choice-of-law189 models.  Such models
                                                
179. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 171, at 337–42.
180. See, e.g., Catherine T. Struve & R. Polk Wagner, Realspace Sovereigns in
Cyberspace: Problems with the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 989 (2002).
181. See, e.g., Richard Jones & Subhajit Basu, Taxation of Electronic Commerce: A
Developing Problem, 16 INT’L REV. L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 35, 38 (2002).
182. See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, Chasing Bits Across Borders, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 35
(2001).
183. Compare, e.g., Beth Stephens, Individuals Enforcing International Law: The
Comparative and Historical Context, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 433 (2002), with Curtis Bradley,
The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 587 (2002).
184. Compare, e.g., Diane F. Orentlicher, Unilateral Multilateralism: United States
Policy Toward the International Criminal Court, 36 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 415 (2004), with
Jack Goldsmith & Stephen D. Krasner, The Limits of Idealism, DÆDALUS 47 (Winter 2003).
185. See Brief of Respondents, Rasul v. Bush, 2004 WL 425739.
186. See Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
187. For example, reflecting some of the ideas about territoriality and community
definition discussed previously (see supra notes 101–127 and accompanying text), some U.S.
courts, in analyzing their jurisdiction over defendants based on content posted online, have
eschewed a focus on the number of “contacts” with a locality and have instead analyzed the
community affiliation of the defendant.  Thus, a defendant who operates a website that does
not create substantive community ties in a distant jurisdiction might not be subject to suit
there even if there are internet contacts with that jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Young v. New Haven
Advocate, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2003) (ruling that Virginia courts do not have jurisdiction
over Connecticut newspapers, regardless of internet contacts, because content of the
newspapers’ websites was “decidedly local”); Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126 F.2d
25 (2d Cir. 1997) (concluding that Missouri cabaret could not be sued in New York for
domain name trademark violation because cabaret was of “local character”); Cybersell, Inc.
v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997) (analyzing whether Florida corporation,
through its website, had created any substantive ties to Arizona, rather than focusing on the
number of contacts).  See also Berman, supra note 171, at 512–33 (discussing the
implications of a community affiliation analysis).
188. See, e.g., Brian Concannon Jr., Beyond Complementarity: The International
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would ask judges to use the insights of comparative law and take
seriously their judicial role as transnational legal actors who function
as part of an interlocking multinational legal system.
B. “Jurispersuasion” and the Articulation of Norms
While the previous section addressed ways in which doctrinal
rules of legal jurisdiction might evolve to reflect the realities of
community definition and cross-border interaction, law and
globalization scholars might also investigate the broader question of
whether jurisdiction provides a more appropriate framework for
understanding law in a global era than sovereignty does.  As
discussed previously, sovereignty may be a concept ill-suited to an
understanding of globalization because sovereignty tends to focus our
attention on who possesses coercive enforcement power.  In contrast,
jurisdiction implicates the more expansive idea of norm articulation
and persuasion.  Indeed, the word “jurisdiction” derives from Latin
roots literally meaning “to speak the law,” and we must therefore look
not so much at the power to enforce legal norms, but at the ability to
                                                                                                                 
Criminal Court and National Prosecutions, A View From Haiti, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 201 (2000) (discussing ways in which the International Criminal Court’s
complementarity regime, supplemented with other forms of aid, can support local
prosecutions); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies:
Choice of Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457, 461 (1991) (claiming that
“nearly unanimous agreement” exists with regard to resolving multinational financial
disputes in a cooperative, central forum); DeNeen L. Brown, Canadians Allow Islamic
Courts to Decide Disputes, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2004, at A14 (discussing an Islamic Court
of Civil Justice in Ontario, staffed by arbitrators trained in both Sha’ria and Canadian civil
law).
189. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflicts of Law:
Re-Defining Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV.  (forthcoming
2005) (articulating choice-of-law and judgment recognition principles that take seriously the
interlocking nature of multinational governance); Buxbaum, supra note 167 (contrasting
traditional model of conflicts analysis, based on territorial sovereignty, with a “substantivist”
approach and suggesting a choice-of-law model combining elements of both); Graeme B.
Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should Create Global Norms,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 469 (2000) (arguing that national courts should decide international
copyright cases not by choosing an applicable law, but by devising an applicable solution,
reflecting the values of all interested systems, national and international, that may have a
prescriptive claim on the outcome); Gunther Teubner & Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Regime
Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 999, 1020 (2004) (arguing for “reorienting the traditional conflicts law away from
conflicts between national legal orders, and refocusing them upon conflicts between sectoral
regimes, such as is the case in the context of collisions between ICANN and national courts,
ICTY and ICJ, WTO and WHO”); Mark D. Rosen, Exporting the Constitution, 53 EMORY
L.J. 171 (2004) (arguing that U.S. courts are not precluded from enforcing a foreign
judgment, even if that judgment would be unconstitutional if issued by a U.S. court in the
first instance).
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articulate them.  This is a crucial distinction because in a world of
law and globalization the mere speaking of legal norms may, over
time, persuade others to enforce them.
Accordingly, law and globalization scholars may re-conceive
the assertion of jurisdiction (or jurispersuasion, if you will) as simply
a mechanism that opens the space for articulation of a norm.  If this is
how we look at jurisdiction, then we can uncouple it from
enforcement.  Enforcement depends on whether those who assert
jurisdiction can persuade those who possess coercive power (e.g. the
police force and the military) to enforce the judgment issued.  This is,
of course, the root of the old truism that a constitutional court can
never get too far ahead or behind popular opinion or it risks losing its
legitimacy.
From this perspective, law is not merely the coercive
command of a sovereign power, but a language for imagining
alternative future worlds.  Moreover, various norm-generating
communities—not just the sovereign—are always contesting the
shape of such worlds.190  Jurisdiction becomes the way a
community—any community—seizes the language of law, attempts
to construct itself as a coherent community, and offers a norm,
thereby asserting its “soft” power.191
This idea of legal jurisdiction as rhetorical persuasion is
played out repeatedly in a world of law and globalization, because
entities without literal enforcement power often exert normative force
through the assertion of jurisdiction.  Such assertions of jurisdiction
often have real impact despite the lack of enforcement power.  Thus, a
Spanish judge’s efforts to prosecute former Chilean leader Augusto
Pinochet, although not literally “successful” because Pinochet was
never extradited, nevertheless helped create a new precedent in
international law regarding head-of-state immunity,192 sparked new
                                                
190. See Cover, supra note 83, at 43.
191. See JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER: WHY THE WORLD’S
ONLY SUPERPOWER CAN’T GO IT ALONE  9 (2002).
192. See Sugarman, supra note 8, at 116 (arguing that “[t]he Pinochet precedent signals a
larger potential role for domestic courts and the extension of the obligations of governments
to adhere to minimum standards of human rights.”).  Such bold assertions of jurisdiction, not
surprisingly, have provoked a backlash.  For example, the International Court of Justice
subsequently halted a Belgian prosecution of the former Foreign Affairs Minister of the
Democratic Republic of Congo, citing the need for governmental immunity in some
circumstances.  See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), General List No. 121,
para. 70 (Feb. 14, 2002), available at
 http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/icobe_ijudgment_20020214.PDF, (finding
that “[G]iven the nature and purpose of the warrant, its mere issue violated the immunity
which Mr. Yerodia enjoyed as the Congo’s incumbent Minister of Foreign Affairs.”).  On the
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human rights activity in Chile itself, and may ultimately lead to
domestic prosecution of Pinochet.193  Likewise, Spanish efforts to
prosecute members of the Argentine military have served to
strengthen the hands of reformers within the Argentine government,
most notably the new President Nestor Kirschner.194  And even in the
United States, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals recently
stayed an execution195 based in part on a prior decision of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) concerning the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations,196 even though the ICJ had no
means of enforcing its decision in Oklahoma.
In the trade context, although ad hoc tribunals convened under
Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
have no authority to directly reverse the decisions of national courts
or create formally binding precedent, Robert Ahdieh has argued that,
over time, we may see the interactions between the NAFTA panels
and national courts take on a dialectical quality that is neither the
direct hierarchical review traditionally undertaken by appellate courts,
nor simply the dialogue that often occurs under the doctrine of
comity.197  Instead, Ahdieh predicts that international courts are likely
to exert an important influence even as the national courts retain
formal independence, much as U.S. federal courts exercising habeas
                                                                                                                 
other hand, this decision was sharply criticized.  See, e.g., Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000
(Congo v. Belg.) (Al-Khasawneh, J., dissenting), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/icobeijudgment_20020214_al-
khasawneh.PDF (criticizing the majority on the ground that there are no exceptions to the
immunity of high-ranking state officials when they are accused of crimes against humanity);
Press Release, International Commission of Jurists, International Court of Justice’s Ruling
on Belgian Arrest Warrant Undermines International Law (Feb. 15, 2002),  at
http://www.icj.org/article.php?sid=166 (“International humanitarian law and international
human rights law have accorded national States jurisdiction over persons committing
international crimes in order to combat impunity. Yesterday’s decision is one that might have
been expected sixty years ago, but not in the light of present-day law.”).
193. See Chile’s Top Court Strips Pinochet of Immunity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2004, at
A3 (“Chile’s Supreme Court stripped the former dictator Augusto Pinochet of immunity from
prosecution in a notorious human rights case on Thursday, raising hopes of victims that he
may finally face trial for abuses during his 17-year rule.”).
194. See Argentina’s Day of Reckoning, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 24, 2004, at C26 (discussing
Kirchner’s signing of a decree allowing international prosecution of dozens of Argentine
military officers accused by Spanish prosecutor Baltasar Garzon of genocide and torture).
Kirchner also successfully lobbied the Argentine Congress to repeal amnesty laws and
statutes of limitations that had stymied all domestic prosecutions of officers accused of
involvement in Argentina’s “dirty war.”  Id.
195. Torres v. Oklahoma (Torres II), No. PCD-04-442 (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004)
(order granting stay of execution and remanding case for evidentiary hearing).
196. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, (Mex. v. U.S.), 43 I.L.M. 581 (Mar. 31,
2004).
197. See Ahdieh, supra note 143.
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corpus jurisdiction may influence state court interpretations of U.S.
constitutional norms in criminal cases.198  In turn, the decisions of
national courts may also come to influence international tribunals.
This dialectical relationship, if it emerges, will exist without an
official hierarchical relationship based on coercive power.199
Turning to the realm of online regulation, when a French court
asserted jurisdiction over internet service provider Yahoo!, ordering
the company to block Nazi memorabilia and Holocaust-denial
material from being accessed through Yahoo! in France,200 the
prosecution (as in the Pinochet case) was technically unsuccessful in
the sense that Yahoo! immediately sought a U.S. court order declaring
the French order unenforceable.201  Yet, at the same time Yahoo!
“voluntarily” capitulated to the French order,202 perhaps moved by the
public pressure the French court decision had engendered.203
Similarly, when a Human Rights Tribunal in Canada ordered Ernst
Zündel, a former Canadian resident then living in the United States, to
remove anti-Semitic hate speech from his California-based Internet
site,204 the order acknowledged that the Tribunal might have difficulty
                                                
198. See id. at 2034.
199. To be sure, Chapter 11 tribunals do have the power to issue damage awards that
private litigants can then enforce against federal authorities, but this power is not exercised
against state courts directly.  See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992,
U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1135, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289, 605 (entered into force Jan. 1,
1994) (outlining remedies available under Chapter 11).
200. See T.G.I. Paris, Nov. 20, 2000, available at
http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20001120.htm.  For discussions of the case, see
Berman, supra note 171, at 337–42, 516–21; Joel R. Reidenberg, Yahoo and Democracy on
the Internet, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 261 (2002).
201. See Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp.
2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001).  This decision was subsequently reversed by the Ninth Circuit on
the ground that the district court could not obtain personal jurisdiction over the original
French plaintiffs until they actually sought to enforce the judgment or otherwise engaged in
activity in California.  Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 379
F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2004).
202. See Press Release, Yahoo!, Yahoo! Enhances Commerce Sites for Higher Quality
Online Experience (Jan. 2, 2001), at http://docs.yahoo.com/docs/pr/release675.html
(announcing new product guidelines for its auction sites that prohibit “items that are
associated with groups which promote or glorify hatred and violence”).
203. See, e.g., Troy Wolverton & Jeff Pelline, Yahoo to Charge Auction Fees, Ban Hate
Materials, CNET News.com, Jan. 2, 2001, at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1007-200-
4352889.html (noting that Yahoo!’s new policy regarding hate-related materials followed
action by the French court).  It does appear that although Yahoo! has removed much of the
offending material, the company has not fully complied with the French orders, leaving some
items—such as copies of Mein Kampf, coins, and stamps—still available through
www.yahoo.com.  See Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue, 379 F.3d at 1122.
204. Citron v. Zündel (Can. Human Rights Trib. Jan. 18, 2002), at http://www.chrt-
tcdp.gc.ca/search/files/t460_1596de.pdf.  See also Peter Cameron, Hate Web Sites Have “No
Place in Canadian Society”: Commission, LONDON FREE PRESS, Jan. 19, 2002, at B5
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enforcing its ruling.205  Nevertheless, the Tribunal stated that there
would be “a significant symbolic value in the public denunciation” of
Zündel’s actions and a “potential educative and ultimately larger
preventative benefit that can be achieved by open discussion of the
principles enunciated in our decision.”206  In the aftermath of this
ruling, Zündel was deported from the United States to Canada for
breaching the terms of his visitor’s permit.207  Though the deportation
decision had no formal connection to the Commission’s ruling, it
seems likely that the publicity generated by the Commission played a
role.208  Thus, the Commission’s ruling may have had a very real
impact, even though the Commission itself acknowledged it had no
enforcement power.
Elsewhere, the existence of governmental and judicial
networks means that the rhetoric of legal opinions is more likely to
influence others despite the fact that those opinions are not literally
binding authority beyond their own community.  Even the normative
statements of non-state entities may have authoritative impact on
various sub-communities, and again may have rhetorical impact more
broadly.  Certainly, once we acknowledge the importance of changes
in legal consciousness over time, it becomes clear that enforcement
power is not the only factor in determining the normative power a
jurisdictional assertion might have.
This more fluid model of multiple affiliations, multiple
jurisdictional assertions, and multiple normative statements captures
more accurately than the classical model of territoriality and
sovereignty the way legal rules are being formed and applied in
today’s world.  Whether or not the nation-state is dying, we will need
to come to grips with the diffusion of law across borders and will also
need to understand that the normative statements law inscribes cannot
be so easily bounded off from the world of political rhetoric.
Of course, such jurisdictional pluralism may empower
                                                                                                                 
(describing a ruling that held “an Internet site that promotes hate against any group
contravenes the Canadian Human Rights Act” because “hate messaging has no place in
Canadian Society”).
205. See Citron v. Zündel, supra note 204, para. 298 (“We are extremely conscious of
the limits of the remedial power available in this case.”).  See also Cameron, supra note 204
(quoting a Commission spokesperson as acknowledging that “[w]e have no experience with
enforcing compliance in cases involving the Internet”).
206. Citron v. Zündel, supra note 204, para. 300.
207. See Colin Nickerson, Denier of Holocaust is Deported to Canada; US Move Sparks
Anger, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 21, 2003, at A8.
208. See id. (noting both that Zündel’s “wife is a US citizen—a status often sufficient to
win at least a stay of deportation for someone in Zündel’s position” and that “the INS moved
with unusual speed on a fairly minor violation”).
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illiberal “communities” (from intolerant ethnic groups to
transnational corporations), thereby causing problems for less
powerful communities.  Yet, it is important to recognize that a more
expansive understanding of jurispersuasion does not mean that the
reality of coercive power (or the importance of sovereign nation-
states) will suddenly disappear.  After all, in order for the legal norms
of a non-state community to be enforced, such norms must be adopted
by those with coercive power, and abhorrent assertions of community
dominion are unlikely to achieve widespread acceptance.  Thus, the
enforcement arena would provide a powerful incentive to
communities not to move too far away from a developing
international consensus.  In a sense, this is how even state-sanctioned
courts operate because they lack their own enforcement power.
Courts always issue decisions at the sufferance of their “sovereign,”
and if they choose to defy the entity that enforces their judgments,
they must appeal to a broad base of popular support or risk being
treated as politically irrelevant.  Likewise, a non-state jurisdictional
assertion must make a strong case to the governments of the world
and other political actors that the assertion of community dominion is
appropriate and that the substantive norms expressed are worth
adopting.  A broader conception of what counts as a jurisdictional
assertion does not imply that all such assertions (much less all
normative rules imposed) are justified; it only argues that we extend
the term jurisdiction to these non-state norm-producing acts.  In this
way, multiple communities can attempt to claim the mantle of law,
making it more likely that we will at least notice these alternative
visions, regardless of whether such visions are ultimately adopted
broadly or roundly rejected.  Thus, whether good or bad, this process
of transnational (or non-national) norm development is a phenomenon
that scholars and policymakers must address.
C. Plural Sources of Legal and Quasi-legal Authority
The expanded vision of jurisdiction described above rests in
part on the idea that the state does not hold a monopoly on normative
assertions, or jurispersuasion.  Rather, a variety of non-state
communities are constantly asserting claims to legal authority and
articulating alternative norms that often take hold over time.  And
while international law has often neglected these plural sources of
normative authority, the study of law and globalization more
explicitly includes such legal (and quasi-legal) entities within its
purview.  This shift has many implications for future scholarship.
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Perhaps most importantly, an acknowledgment of legal
pluralism suggests a way out of the endless debates about whether
international or transnational articulations of norms can be regarded
as law at all.  This argument generally rests on the fact that, because
there is no enforcement power apart from nation-states, international
norms are only law to the extent states choose to enforce them.  Legal
pluralists, in contrast, look to whether members of various shifting
and overlapping communities feel themselves bound by articulated
norms, regardless of the enforcement power that may or may not lie
behind those norms.209  Accordingly, scholars of law and globalization
can study the degree to which various international and transnational
norms may have significant binding effects despite lack of
enforcement power.
In addition, legal pluralism focuses attention on the fact that
many transnational or subnational forms of community may be even
more powerful and hold more significant normative force than the
official rules laid down by governmental entities.  For this reason,
those studying international law compliance issues must consider how
various non-state norms might affect the way in which an
international norm is received and transformed on the ground.  To
take an obvious example, the governmental ratification of an
international gender equality norm will not be sufficient to affect
actual gender equality within that state if there are strong non-state
norms (e.g., local customs, religious doctrines) that resist such formal
equality.  In other contexts, we see that international civil society
groups or private standard-setting bodies may have far more leverage
with transnational corporations than individual state governments.210
In both cases, compliance cannot be measured by reference to
governmental acts alone.
Finally, even formal state-sanctioned courts might adopt rules
that acknowledge multiple community affiliations.  For example, in
choosing the substantive legal norms to apply to a transnational
dispute, a court might take into account the fact that the parties have
distant community affiliations211 or are citizens of countries with
                                                
209. See, e.g., Roderick A. MacDonald, Metaphors of Multiplicity: Civil Society,
Regimes, and Legal Pluralism, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 69, 71 (1998) (“[A] legal
pluralistic approach frees the legal imagination from structuralist thinking; it frees legal
conceptions of normativity from the assumptions of Weberian formal-rationality; and it frees
legal notions of relationships from their anchorage in official institutions of third-party
dispute resolution.”).
210. See supra notes 148–149 and accompanying text.
211. See, e.g., Chander, supra note 73 (arguing that India’s securities laws should be
applied to purchases of Indian debt instruments by members of the Indian diaspora, even
though the purchases were made in the United States).
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conflicting laws212 and therefore seek to blend a variety of
transnational norms.  Similarly, in the constitution of so-called
“hybrid” domestic/international courts to address past atrocities in
post-conflict societies, judges are often drawn from a variety of
communities within the society as well as from the international
community at large.213  These developments reflect the increasing
need for official law to acknowledge (and sometimes accommodate)
people’s affiliations with multiple communities.
D. Cosmopolitanism and Law
The plural vision at the heart of these first three areas of
inquiry lays the groundwork for a fourth: the possibility of a
cosmopolitan conception of law.  Scholars of law and globalization
are ideally situated to undertake this inquiry.
Although cosmopolitanism is often confused with a kind of
utopian universalism, cosmopolitanism is actually a useful trope for
conceptualizing law and globalization precisely because it recognizes
that people have multiple affiliations, extending from the local to the
global (and many non-territorial affiliations as well).  For example,
Martha Nussbaum has stressed that cosmopolitanism does not require
one to give up local identifications, which, she acknowledges, “can be
a source of great richness in life.”214  Rather, following the Stoics, she
suggests that we think of ourselves as surrounded by a series of
concentric circles:
The first one encircles the self, the next takes in the
immediate family, then follows the extended family,
then, in order, neighbors or local groups, fellow city-
dwellers, and fellow countrymen—and we can easily
add to this list groupings based on ethnic, linguistic,
historical, professional, gender, or sexual identities.
Outside all these circles is the largest one, humanity as
                                                
212. See, e.g., Dinwoodie, supra note 189 (arguing that national courts should decide
international copyright cases through the construction of copyright norms that reflect the
values of all interested systems, national and international, that may have a prescriptive claim
on the outcome).
213. See, e.g., Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT’L L.
295 (2003) (describing the creation of courts composed of both domestic and international
judges to try human rights violators in post-conflict societies).
214. Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, in FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY:
DEBATING THE LIMITS OF PATRIOTISM 9 (Joshua Cohen ed., 1996).
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a whole.215
Therefore, we need not relinquish special affiliations and
identifications with the various groups of which we may feel a part.216
In this vision, people could be “cosmopolitan patriots,”217
accepting their responsibility to nurture the culture and politics of
their home community, while at the same time recognizing that such
cultural practices are always shifting, as people move from place to
place.  “The result would be a world in which each local form of
human life is the result of long-term and persistent processes of
cultural hybridization—a world, in that respect, much like the world
we live in now.”218
Thus, cosmopolitanism is emphatically not a model of
international citizenship in the sense of international harmonization
and standardization, but is instead a recognition of multiple refracted
differences where people acknowledge links with the “other” without
demanding assimilation or ostracism.  Cosmopolitanism seeks
“flexible citizenship,”219 in which people are permitted to shift
identities amid a plurality of possible affiliations and allegiances,
including non-territorial communities.  The cosmopolitan worldview
shifts back and forth from the rooted particularity of personal identity
to the global possibility of multiple overlapping communities.
“[I]nstead of an ideal of detachment, actually existing
cosmopolitanism is a reality of (re)attachment, multiple attachment,
or attachment at a distance.”220
A cosmopolitan conception of law, therefore, aims to capture a
middle ground between strict territorialism on the one hand and
expansive universalism on the other.  As we have seen, a territorialist
approach fails to account for the wide variety of community
affiliations and social interactions that defy territorial boundaries.  A
                                                
215. Id.
216. Id. (“We need not think of [local affiliations] as superficial, and we may think of
our identity as constituted partly by them.”).
217. Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitan Patriots, in COSMOPOLITICS: THINKING
AND FEELING BEYOND THE NATION 91 (Pheng Cheah & Bruce Robbins eds., 1998)
[hereinafter COSMOPOLITICS].
218. Id. at 92.
219. See AIHWA ONG, FLEXIBLE CITIZENSHIP: THE CULTURAL LOGICS OF
TRANSNATIONALITY 6 (1999) (describing how “the cultural logics of capitalist accumulation,
travel, and displacement that induce subjects to respond fluidly and opportunistically to
changing political-economic conditions” foster a form of transnationality she calls “flexible
citizenship”).
220. Bruce Robbins, Introduction Part I: Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism, in
COSMOPOLITICS, supra note 217, at 1, 3.
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more universalist perspective, by contrast, which seeks to imagine
people as world citizens first and foremost, might seem to be a useful
alternative.  But such universalism tends to presuppose a world
citizenry devoid of both particularist ties and normative discussion
about the relative importance of such ties.  Thus, universalism cuts off
debate about the nature of overlapping communities just as surely as
territorialism does.
A cosmopolitan conception, in contrast, makes no attempt to
deny the multirooted nature of individuals within a variety of
communities, both territorial and non-territorial.  Thus, although a
cosmopolitan conception might acknowledge the potential importance
of asserting universal norms in specific circumstances, it does not
require a universalist belief in a single world community.  As a result,
cosmopolitanism offers a promising rubric for analyzing law in a
world of diverse normative voices.
E. The Sociological and Psychological Processes of Legal
Consciousness
Even if one stays within the parameters of mainstream debates
about the efficacy of international law, an approach emphasizing law
and globalization, with its focus on legal consciousness, may have
much to contribute.  These debates often center on states: Do states
comply with international law?  If so, why do they comply?  And, is it
possible that, even when states formally comply (i.e., by signing
treaties), such compliance nevertheless hides a lack of real change in
their internal behavior?  Studying legal consciousness allows scholars
to recognize (and perhaps document) ways in which norms may
become inculcated in the everyday lives and thoughts of people,
regardless of official governmental compliance with international law
norms.
Compliance has, of course, long been a prominent issue in
international law.  Because international norms often have no formal
enforcement power behind them, scholars have wondered whether
such norms have any real effect.  For years, however, this debate was
characterized more by competing ideological commitments than
reliance on data.  Thus, champions of international law essentially
took it on faith that “almost all nations observe almost all principles
of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of
the time.”221  Indeed, as one scholar has noted, “the claim that
                                                
221. LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979) (emphasis omitted).  See
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international law matters was until recently so widely accepted among
international lawyers that there have been relatively few efforts to
examine its accuracy.”222  On the other side, those skeptical of
international law have viewed such norms as irrelevant to the power
politics that are often seen as the true engine of norm development on
the world stage.223  This approach assumes that states are motivated
primarily by their geopolitical interests and that international law
exists and is complied with only when it is in the interests of powerful
states to do so.224  These powerful states may then coerce less
powerful states into accepting the regime, but in any event the norms
of international law are largely immaterial.  Even so-called
“neorealists,” who have substituted rational choice theory for a pure
emphasis on power, nevertheless retain the focus on states, which are
treated as unitary rational actors seeking primarily to ensure their own
preservation and dominate others.225  Such a focus acknowledges the
                                                                                                                 
also CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 168, at 3 (“[F]oreign policy practitioners operate on the
assumption of a general propensity of states to comply with international obligations.”);
Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT’L ORG. 175, 176 (1993);
Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1823 (2002); Koh, supra note 3, at 2599.
222. Hathaway, supra note 35, at 1937.  See also S.M. Schwebel, Commentary, in
COMPLIANCE WITH JUDGMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 39, 39 (M.K. Bulterman & M.
Kuijer eds., 1996) (“Compliance is a problem which lawyers tend to avoid rather than
confront.”); Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing
Conceptions of International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 345 (1998).  Kingsbury comments
that:
[T]he first empirical task is to determine whether, as is often asserted by
international lawyers, most States and other subjects of international law
conform to most legal rules most of the time. We have impressions which may
rise to the level of “anecdata,” but in many areas we simply do not have
systematic studies to show whether or not most States conform to most
international law rules most of the time . . .
Id. at 346 (citations omitted)).
223. See, e.g., Francis A. Boyle, The Irrelevance of International Law: The Schism
Between International Law and International Politics, 10 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 193 (1980)
(arguing against the importance of international law); Jack Goldsmith, Should International
Human Rights Law Trump U.S. Domestic Law?, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 327, 337 (2000) (“Nations
that increase protection for their citizens’ human rights rarely do so because of the pull of
international law.”); Robert H. Bork, The Limits of “International Law,” NAT’L INT., Winter
1989–1990, at 3 (arguing against the importance of international law).  See also, e.g.,
EDWARD HALLETT CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS’ CRISIS 1919–1939 (Harper & Row 1946)
(1939); HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS (3d ed. 1966); Hans J.
Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law, 34 AM. J. INT’L L. 260
(1940).
224. See, e.g., KRASNER, supra note 155, at 7; GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 14.
But see supra note 14 (challenging this view).
225. See, e.g., KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 118 (1979)
(viewing states as “unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a
maximum, drive for universal domination”).
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efficacy of international law norms only to the extent that it is in the
rational self-interest of states to acknowledge such norms.
In an attempt to get beyond this intractable ideological
dispute, international law scholars have begun to explore the
possibility of taking a more empirical approach to questions about
international law compliance.226  For example, scholars of both
international law and international relations have attempted to
conduct empirical studies within the fields of international trade,227
international environmental law,228 and increasingly, international
human rights229 regarding the conditions under which compliance
with international treaty obligations is most likely to occur.  Yet, even
these empirical studies are largely concerned with the degree to which
states are formally implementing various policies or practices to
comply with the requirements of the treaties those states have signed.
Thus, the focus remains limited to the official mechanisms of law.
The past decade has also seen the emergence of what may be a
promising theoretical framework for studying the way in which
transnational and international norms are internalized by domestic
legal systems over time.  Dubbed “transnational legal process,” this
framework has the advantage of taking seriously the idea that norms
may seep into a legal system in ways more complicated than simply
the formal rules or policies enacted by the official organs of
government.230  And some useful work in this vein has used
                                                
226. Indeed, during the past two years alone, sessions on empirical approaches to
international law have been convened at the annual meetings of both the Law and Society
Association and the American Society of International Law.  See Program of the Annual
Meeting of the Law & Society Ass’n, Sess. 3216: Roundtable—Empirical Approaches to
International Human Rights Law, at 47 (June 7, 2003); Panel—Empirical Work in Human
Rights, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 197 (2004).
227. See, e.g., ADJUDICATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL
AND NATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann & Gunther Jaenicke eds., 1992);
ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE
MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM (1993); ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND
WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY (2d ed. 1990); Curtis Reitz, Enforcement of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 555 (1996).
228. See, e.g., Philippe Sands, Compliance with International Environmental
Obligations, in IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 48
(James Cameron et al. eds., 1996); INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH: SOURCES OF EFFECTIVE
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (Peter M. Haas et al. eds., 1993); ORAN R.
YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT IN A STATELESS
SOCIETY (1994); Harold K. Jacobson & Edith Brown Weiss, Strengthening Compliance with
International Environmental Accords: Preliminary Observations from a Collaborative
Project, 1 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 119 (1995).
229. See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 35; Goodman & Jinks, Measuring the Effects of
Human Rights Treaties, supra note 35; Goodman & Jinks, How to Influence States:
Socialization and International Human Rights Law, supra note 35.
230. See, e.g., Koh, Transnational Legal Process, supra note 6.
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institutional sociology to try to understand, in a more nuanced way,
how it is that bureaucracies actually internalize norms.231  Yet, more is
needed to fully flesh out the idea of transnational legal process in
order to see how norm internalization actually takes place outside of
the official organs of government.232  Thus, while it seems intuitively
correct to say that “[i]nternational articulation of rights norms has
reshaped domestic dialogues in law, politics, academia, public
consciousness, civil society, and the press,”233 it is another matter
entirely to try to study this “re-shaping” process on the ground in
concrete settings.
For example, many African countries, responding in part to
pressure from international human rights activists, have recently
enacted laws forbidding the practice known as female genital
circumcision.234  But perhaps the best place to trace changes in legal
consciousness about such circumcisions is in the variety of local
settings where the practice had been widespread.  Local human rights
groups have mobilized religious leaders to convince those who
perform the female circumcisions that the practice is wrong.235  In
addition, where once those who performed the circumcisions were
venerated in their communities and well-paid for their work, those
emblems of social status are disappearing.236  These developments are,
of course, not necessarily unrelated to changes in official law, but it
seems clear that, if one wants to understand the possible effects of
international law norms over time, studying simply the acts of
national parliaments is insufficient.237  Moreover, armed with a more
                                                
231. See, e.g., Goodman & Jinks, supra note 162.
232. For an example of such scholarship in the context of trade, see Janet Koven Levit,
The Dynamics of International Trade Finance Regulation: the Arrangement on Officially
Supported Export Credits, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 65 (2004).
233. Douglass Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference? 2 CHI.
J. INT’L L. 121, 122 (2001).
234. Leigh A. Trueblood, Female Genital Mutilation: A Discussion of International
Human Rights Instruments, Cultural Sovereignty and Dominance Theory, 28 DENV. J. INT’L
L. & POL’Y 437, 465 (2000) (describing how the efforts of international organizations,
NGOs, and other groups have led many countries, including Cameroon, Egypt, Kenya,
Sudan, Burkina Faso, and Ivory Coast, to pass legislation against female genital
circumcision).
235. See Tina Rosenberg, Mutilating Africa’s Daughters: Laws Unenforced, Practices
Unchanged, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2004, at A14 (“One strategy that has proved effective [in
decreasing female genital circumcision] is persuading religious leaders to dispel the
widespread belief that Islam calls for circumcision.”).
236. Id.
237. For a more contextualized analysis of the practice, see, for example, Christine J.
Walley, Searching for “Voices”: Feminism, Anthropology, and the Global Debate over
Female Genital Operations, 12 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 405 (1997).
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complex understanding of how cultural changes occur, we could
conceptualize the human rights monitoring process “as a gradual
cultural transformation rather than as law without sanctions
confronting intractable cultural differences.”238
Legal consciousness scholarship therefore provides a model
for international law scholars to follow as they broaden their gaze to
include not only official governmental behavior but also the attitudes,
aspirations, and lay understandings of justice that circulate in
everyday life.  Such effects probably cannot be quantified, but they
certainly can be studied qualitatively.239  And given that one of the
key aspects of law and globalization is the articulation of norms
across borders, international law scholars need to consider how such
norms may affect legal consciousness over time, not just in the halls
of government, but in the streets of cities and towns, the shopping
aisles of local markets, the meeting halls of communities, and the
living rooms of homes around the world.
F. The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations
As discussed previously, law and globalization scholars are
increasingly taking account of non-governmental organizations as an
important normative force on the international scene.  Interestingly,
civil society initiatives function sometimes as an aspect of
globalization by challenging nation-state sovereignty, particularly
with regard to human rights norms, and other times as an organized
resistance to globalization, particularly with regard to economic,
trade, environmental, and labor policy.  Transnational networks of
lawyers also work to challenge many of the perceived injustices of
globalization.240
Such transnational policy efforts have been deployed with
increasing frequency.  For example, the international anti-apartheid
movement was perhaps the first successful global civil society effort
to combine shareholder, consumer, and governmental action,
                                                
238. Merry, supra note 70, at 974.
239. See, e.g., Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The
Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 539 (2005) (discussing the interaction of
international and local criminal law norms in Afghanistan and Rwanda).
240. See Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold, State Transformation, Globalization, and
the Possibilities of Cause Lawyering: An Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE
IN A GLOBAL ERA 3, 4 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2001) (“[D]emocratization and
globalization confront cause lawyers with new issues and new burdens while altering their
resources and their tactical and strategic options.”).
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persuading many corporations, universities, and pension funds to
divest themselves of South African investments long before official
national sanctions were in place.241  Since then, similar boycott efforts
have resulted in changes to tuna-fishing practices so as to protect
dolphins,242 a decision by the French government to suspend its
nuclear testing program,243 and alterations in Shell Oil’s
decommissioning of a rig in the North Atlantic.244
In addition, NGOs increasingly formulate global standards of
corporate behavior.  These “codes of conduct” have appeared most
prominently with regard to human rights, environmental protection,
and fair labor standards.  As The Economist has observed, “a
multinational’s failure to look like a good global citizen is
increasingly expensive in a world where consumers and pressure
groups can be quickly mobilised behind a cause.”245  In response,
prominent corporate leaders, including AT&T, Federal Express,
Honeywell, and TimeWarner, have established Business for Social
Responsibility—“[a] global nonprofit organization that helps member
countries achieve commercial success in ways that respect ethical
values, peoples, communities, and the environment.”246  Furthermore,
                                                
241. See Peter J. Spiro, New Global Potentates: Nongovernmental Organizations and the
“Unregulated” Marketplace, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 957, 959 (1996) (detailing how interest
groups, even “[w]here stymied by national regulators[,] . . . can accomplish equivalent results
by commanding consumer preferences, which in turn works to constrain corporate or state
behavior”).
242. See Stop This Carnage: Hundreds of Our Dolphins Are Dying, W. MORNING NEWS
(U.K.), Feb. 7, 2002, at 1 (reporting that “wall of death” nets regularly threatened dolphins a
decade ago, but now successful public awareness campaigns have led to changes in tuna-
fishing techniques, and tuna manufacturers routinely label their tuna containers as “dolphin
safe”); 45 NOAA SEAPOWER (Jan. 1, 2002), available at 2002 WL 13922711 (reporting a
“notable success” in forging “international cooperation that allows ‘dolphin-safe’ tuna to be
harvested, while ensuring the health of dolphin stocks”).  For a discussion of the tuna-dolphin
controversy as part of a consideration of the potential role of unilateral trade sanctions in
protecting environmental resources, see Richard W. Parker, The Use and Abuse of Trade
Leverage to Protect the Global Commons: What We Can Learn from the Tuna-Dolphin
Conflict, 12 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1999).
243. See Greenpeace International Founder Dies in Car Crash, ENV’T NEWS SERVICE
(Mar. 23, 2001), at http://ens-news.com/ens/mar2001/2001-03-23-12.asp (crediting
Greenpeace with creating pressure that helped push the French government to end its nuclear
testing program).
244. See Allan Pulsipher & William Daniel IV, Onshore-Only Platform Disposition
Needs Exceptions, OIL & GAS J. 64 (2001) (reporting that Shell’s decision to cancel its plan
for an “at-sea disposition” of an oil rig followed an unexpectedly fierce campaign featuring
public boycotts).
245. Multinationals and Their Morals, ECONOMIST, Dec. 2, 1995, at 18.
246. Mission, Business for Social Responsibility, at
http://www.bsr.org/meta/about/mission.cfm.  Similarly, the World Business Council for
Sustainable Development evinces a commitment “[t]o provide business leadership as a
catalyst for change toward sustainable development, and to promote the role of eco–
BERMAN PRINT VERSION.DOC 03/29/05  5:38 PM
548 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [43:485
especially in the wake of the global movement against sweatshops,247
NGOs have been able to persuade many corporations to accept
independent monitoring of adopted standards.248
More controversially, NGOs often claim to represent a global
polity, and international organizations may include NGOs in their
deliberative processes as a way of overcoming what might otherwise
be deemed a “democratic deficit.”249  Some argue, however, that
NGOs are more appropriately seen as interest groups focused on
specific issues than as representatives of “bottom-up”
constituencies.250  On the other hand, claims of democratic deficit tend
to privilege those actors who can derive their authority, no matter how
tenuously, from a voting polity, which is not necessarily the only way
to develop norms that may be deemed legitimate over time.  Thus,
one question for scholars is how exactly to conceive of NGOs and
their proper institutional role.  Another promising avenue of
scholarship explores how funding decisions by foundations and
governments (mostly from industrialized countries) affect the
activities of NGOs, which may rely on such funding for substantial
                                                                                                                 
efficiency, innovation and corporate social responsibility”.  About the WBCSD, at
http://www.wbcsd.ch/templates/TemplateWBCSD1/layout.asp?type=p&
MenuId=NjA&doOpen=1&ClickMenu=LeftMenu.
247. See Ethan B. Kapstein, The Corporate Ethics Crusade, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.–Oct.
2001, at 105, 109 (noting that:
Many prominent apparel companies, including Nike, Adidas, and the Gap,
began to experience the full force of NGO and media rage [regarding
sweatshops], with a barrage of stories and Internet-based campaigns aimed
against their products.  Students lobbied their universities to sever business ties
with companies that employed sweatshop labor.  As a result, several firms
changed their behavior, raising standards abroad and inviting independent
monitors to assess their progress.  A growing number of companies even hired
vice presidents for “corporate social responsibility.”).
For a recent argument that American corporations affiliated with sweatshops abroad might be
liable under the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of slavery, see Tobias Barrington
Wolff, The Thirteenth Amendment and Slavery in the Global Economy, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
973 (2002).
248. See Spiro, supra note 241, at 962 (remarking that corporations reacted positively to
proposed independent monitoring).  For an overview of the various forms the imposition of
human rights norms have taken, see Chris Avery, Business and Human Rights in a Time of
Change, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 17
(Menno T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000).
249. Cf., e.g., Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative
Character of Supranationalism: The Example of the European Community, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 628, 633 (1999) (noting that such a deficit occurs whenever normative power is
transferred to “agents that are not electorally responsible in any direct sense to the ‘people’
whose ‘sovereignty,’ or at least some portion of it, the agents are said to exercise”).
250. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role
of International Non-governmental Organizations and the Idea of International Civil Society,
11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 91 (2000).
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portions of their budgets.251  And researchers are developing models
for conceptualizing the role of NGOs as norm entrepreneurs who
draw upon transnational networks of nonprofits, scholars, foreign
governments, and multilateral institutions to place issues on the
agendas of nation-state governments.252  All of this research helps to
focus attention on these important actors in the development of
international and transnational norms.
G. The Importance of Institutions
As discussed previously, it is not sufficient for international
law scholars to study broad declarations of formal law without also
considering the institutional bureaucratic mechanisms that will
implement the law, as well as the demands those bureaucratic actors
are likely to face.  This realization may perhaps account for the
increasing scholarly interest in NGOs, because one of the most
important roles that NGOs play in the international system is to
scrutinize local bureaucratic actors and apply various forms of
pressure.  Likewise, scholars are recognizing that official international
institutions, such as the UN, can also pressure local bureaucracies, for
example, by creating international commissions of inquiry concerning
alleged atrocities, or threatening prosecutions in international courts.
Such declarations can empower reformers within local bureaucracies,
who can then argue for institutional changes as a way of staving off
international interference.253
                                                
251. Indeed, as Sally Merry points out:
[I]n many other areas of international activity, the sharp disparities in resources
between North and South radically limit the ability of some NGOs to participate
in the [international treaty] process.  It is common for North foundations and
governments to fund NGOs from the South. . . .  Human rights documents create
the legal categories and legal norms . . . but the dissemination of these norms
and categories depends on NGOs seizing this language and using it to generate
public support or governmental discomfort.  This is a fragile and haphazard
process, very vulnerable to existing inequalities among nations and the
availability of donors.
Merry, supra note 70, at 973.
252. See, e.g., Catherine Powell, The Role of Transnational Norm Entrepreneurs in the
U.S. “War on Terrorism,” 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES. L. 47 (2004).  See also supra note 71.
253. See, e.g., Laura A. Dickinson, The Dance of Complementarity: Relationships
Among Domestic, International, and Transnational Accountability Mechanisms in East
Timor and Indonesia, in ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSES 319, 358–61 (Jane Stromseth ed., 2003) (discussing ways in which international
pressure on Indonesia in the period just after East Timor gained its independence
strengthened the hand of reformers within the Indonesian government to push for robust
domestic accountability mechanisms for atrocities committed during the period leading up to
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In addition, a focus on institutions allows us to see that nation-
states are not unitary actors pursuing their “self-interest” on the world
stage.  Rather, they are organizational entities embedded in a wider
social environment of international norms.  Indeed, even “the
organizational form of the modern state” may be defined by
“worldwide models constructed and propagated through global
cultural and associational processes.”254  On this view, states are
themselves creatures of international orthodoxy and custom, and they
tend to reflect those values.  Thus, we see the bureaucratic institutions
of the nation-state facing pressures from the international, the
subnational, and the transnational.  The way in which these pressures
affect bureaucracies over time is an important topic for sociological
and legal inquiry.
H. The Privatization of State Functions
One of the reasons that it is so important to conceive of law
beyond the state is that the state itself is increasingly delegating
authority to private actors who exist in a shadowy world of quasi-
public/quasi-private authority.  The issue of private parties exercising
forms of governmentally authorized power has long been a subject of
U.S. constitutional law jurisprudence and scholarship, but
international law scholars are only just beginning to consider such
issues.  Thus, for example, P.W. Singer notes that many military
activities—including combat, surveillance, training, and interrogation
functions—are increasingly being contracted out to private
companies.255  Yet, both domestic and international accountability
mechanisms have historically been premised on such roles being
played by governmental actors.  And the literature on privatization in
the domestic context often focuses on the U.S. constitutional doctrines
of “state action” or nondelegation of congressional authority to
administrative agencies.256  Neither of these analytical frameworks is
precisely applicable to the international context.  Thus, over the
coming decade, scholars of law and globalization undoubtedly will
                                                                                                                 
the independence vote).
254. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 162, at 1752.
255. See P.W. Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms
and International Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 521 (2004).
256. For some recent examples of this literature, see Jody Freeman, Extending Public
Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (2003); Gillian E. Metzger,
Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003); Martha Minow, Public and
Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229 (2003).
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explore the many ramifications of this new trend in governance.
I. The Multidirectional Interaction of Local, National, and
International Norms
Both international law triumphalists and international law
critics tend to share in common a top-down vision of international
law.  From this perspective, international norms are imposed on
nation-states or local actors, and the challenge (or the fear) is the
degree to which various populations imbibe the international norm.
As the preceding discussions should make clear, however, the
reality is far more complicated.  Nation-state bureaucracies may
imbibe institutional roles from each other.  The “international
community” is not a monolithic entity, but a collection of interests.
“Local” norms are always contested, even within their communities,
and “local” actors may well invoke “non-local” norms for strategic or
political advantage.  Moreover, local actors deploying or resisting
national or international norms may well subvert or transform them,
and the resulting transformation is sure to seep back “up” so that, over
time, the “international” norm is transformed as well.  And on and on.
Thus, the local, the national, and the international are all
constantly shifting concepts.  Accordingly, scholars of law and
globalization must study the back and forth of the feedback loops:
How do local actors access the power of NGOs?  How are
governmental and foundation funding decisions made, and how do
funding priorities affect the projects undertaken around the world?
How are global norms deployed locally?  Do local concerns get
strategically transformed by elected elites at the national level?  How
do UN bureaucracies foster the creation of a cadre of “local” actors
who are more aligned with other UN officials than with those in their
“home” countries?  What role do Western universities play in the
creation of national and local norms given that many “local” elites are
educated abroad?  Only through a more fine-grained, nuanced
understanding of the way legal norms are passed on from one group
to the other and then transformed before spreading back again can law
and globalization scholars begin to approach the multifaceted ways in
which legal norms develop.
J. The Problematics of Globalization
No analysis of law and globalization is possible without
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acknowledging the contested nature of both the terms “law” and
“globalization.”  This Article obviously takes a broad view of what
counts as law, including within its purview not only official norms
articulated by state sanctioned regulatory bodies and courts, but also
“non-official” legal norms that often bind subnational, transnational,
or international communities.  With regard to globalization, the vast
debates concerning its meaning, its importance, and even its existence
could fill many volumes.  Therefore, I will be content merely to hint
at some of the major questions.
First, of course, is the question of what exactly globalization
is.  For purposes of this Article, however, I have not attempted to
articulate a single definition because part of the premise of law and
globalization is that multiple definitions and meanings for
globalization will be salient for different populations.  Thus, I have
used the term to refer generally to the intensification of global
interconnectedness, in which capital, people, commodities, images,
and ideologies move across distance and physical boundaries with
increasing speed and frequency.257  And I have been content to
acknowledge that the existence of many different visions of
globalization is a fundamental part of globalization itself.
Second, there is the question of whether globalization is really
a new phenomenon at all.  Certainly, interrelations among multiple
populations across territorial boundaries have existed for centuries.
For example, some argue that the pre-1914 era was in fact the high-
water mark for economic interdependence, although there is also
evidence that the post-1989 era surpasses that period.258  Yet, again I
do not think such arguments need detain us here.  First of all, it seems
clear that something is going on, given the pervasiveness of the
ideology of market capitalism, the speed of commodity, capital, and
                                                
257. See, e.g., ANTHONY GIDDENS, RUNAWAY WORLD: HOW GLOBALIZATION IS
RESHAPING OUR LIVES 24–37 (2000) (pointing to the increased level of trade, finance, and
capital flows, and describing the effects of the weakening hold of older nation-states); SASKIA
SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (1998) (analyzing globalization and its
economic, political, and cultural effects on the world); EDWARDS, supra note 76, at 5–6
(“Globalisation challenges the authority of nation states and international institutions to
influence events, while the scale of private flows of capital, technology, information and
ideas makes official transfers look increasingly marginal.”); Appadurai, supra note 103, at
27–29 (“[T]oday’s world involves interactions of a new order and intensity. . . . [W]ith the
advent of the steamship, the automobile, the airplane, the camera, the computer and the
telephone, we have entered into an altogether new condition of neighborliness, even with
those most distant from ourselves . . . .”).
258. See Miles Kahler & David Lake, Globalization and Governance, in GLOBALIZING
AUTHORITY: ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND GOVERNANCE 10–14 (Miles Kahler & David Lake
eds., 2003).  See also Richard Baldwin & Philippe Martin, Two Waves of Globalization:
Superficial Similarities, Fundamental Differences (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 6904, 1999).
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personal movement, the ubiquity of global media, and so on.259
Whether such developments are truly new (or greater than ever
before) seems less important than understanding the consequences of
the phenomena.  Moreover, I see the term “globalization” as also
signifying the attitude about the world that tends to come into being
as a result of frequent use of the term itself.  Indeed, in a certain sense
it does not really matter whether, as an empirical matter, the world is
more or less “globalized” than it used to be.  More important is the
fact that people—whether governmental actors, corporations,
scholars, or general citizens—think and act as if the world is more
interconnected and treat globalization as a real phenomenon.260
Third, there is the criticism that globalization is merely a
continued hegemonic imposition on developing nation-states of the
values, economic orthodoxies, and norms of the industrialized world.
In law this challenge often takes the form of a critique of international
human rights as an imposition of Western norms on “local” culture.
“Such claims reflect a familiar story about the production and
reception of legal consciousness, in which the West is the primary site
of legal production—exporting such goodies as secularism and the
‘rule of law’—and the Third World is the happy receptor of such
knowledge and structures.”261  I believe there is certainly some truth
to the charge that globalization is a new form of empire or hegemony,
and particularly with regard to trade liberalization and open markets,
there seems to be little possibility for a rival ideology to survive.
Turning to law, it is certainly the case that the “international human
rights revolution” since World War II is in some ways modeled on
U.S. rights-based constitutionalism.
Yet, this is only one part of a much more complicated story.
After all, as previously discussed, norms cross borders in both
directions.  And it is simplistic to think that “local” people have
“culture,” which is juxtaposed with an “international” conception of
                                                
259. For example, David G. Post has argued that if one created a map plotting all
activities that have an effect on a particular country, such a map 300 years ago, 100 years
ago, or even 50 years ago would show most of the effects to be clustered fairly closely within
and around the territorial borders of the country.  In contrast, Post contends, now a country is
very likely to be affected by activity elsewhere in the world with no pattern based on
geography at all.  See David G. Post, Against “Against Cyberanarchy”, 17 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1365, 1381–84 (2002).
260. Of course, it may be that globalization actually helps to legitimize a mythical prior
stable order, which can be defined as the presumed order that globalization’s flows of people,
money, and information is supposedly destabilizing.  See Coutin et al., supra note 11.  Yet,
even if this is true, the study of globalization would still be important because only through
such study could this legitimation process be exposed and interrogated.
261. Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399, 1459 (2003).
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rights.262  This vision of culture as a static homogenous system,
resistant to change, differs dramatically from models of culture
developed in the anthropological literature over the last two decades.
These models emphasize “culture as an historical product, constantly
being made and remade and rife with internal conflicts and
differences.”263  Indeed, it is often various local constituencies that are
trying to mobilize ideas such as international human rights to contest
local customs or practices.
In addition, even a legal body such as the WTO dispute
resolution system, which undoubtedly has functioned as a tool of
industrialized nations, nevertheless creates a legal form whose use
cannot be entirely controlled, even by the powerful.  Thus, we see
developing nations (particularly the larger ones, such as Brazil and
India) beginning to use the WTO process against the United States
and the European Union.  Likewise, the idea of criminal
accountability for atrocities, though imposed as victors’ justice at
Nuremberg, has spawned an entire human rights system that can be
invoked even against the powerful.264  For example, the Bush
administration has faced widespread criticism and pressure (both
within the United States and throughout the world) because of its
failure to state unequivocally that it was bound by the Geneva
Conventions in its treatment of prisoners captured in Iraq and
Afghanistan.265
Of course, power is always an important factor, and there is no
doubt that those with military might can more easily control
international legal processes: witness the bilateral agreements that the
United States has induced other nations to sign, agreeing that U.S.
citizens will not be handed over to appear before the International
                                                
262. See, e.g., Walley, supra note 237, at 418–23 (discussing the binary opposition
between “rights” and “culture” in Euro-American literature opposing female genital
operations and arguing that such a formulation constructs African women as “oppressed
victims of patriarchy, ignorance, or both, not as social actors in their own right”).
263. Merry, supra note 70, at 946.  On the other hand, as Merry points out, international
human rights activists often acknowledge the “importance of building on national and local
cultural practices and religious beliefs to promote transformations of marriage, family, and
gender stereotypes. They argue that reforms need to be rooted in existing practices and
religious systems if they are to be accepted.”  Id. at 947.  This more fluid conception of
culture therefore co-exists with “the portrayal of culture as an unchanging and intransigent
obstacle.”  Id.
264. See Cover, supra note 99, at 199 (“It is true that the particular proceedings at
Nuremberg and Tokyo were limited to trials of Axis defendants.  But, the precedent . . . was
one which could not be so circumscribed.”).
265. See, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception
and the Temptation of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001, 1063–64 (2004) (describing criticism
and pressure).
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Criminal Court.266  However, the creation of legal forms at least
provides a rhetorical avenue whereby those with less power may be
able to articulate opposing visions and generate alternative normative
systems that may have effect over time.  Thus, while hegemonic
power is always present, law and globalization can also be counter-
hegemonic, at least at times.267
CONCLUSION
Over the course of the Twentieth Century, international law
lost its privileged place as the primary conceptual framework for
understanding the cross-border development of norms.  The
introduction of universal human rights standards, the recognition of
interdependence among nation-states, the development of
international courts and institutions, the growing diffusion of people,
money, and information across territorial borders, and the increasing
interest in normative development and legal consciousness outside of
formal governmental spheres have collectively eroded the foundations
of traditional positivist public international law, which had often been
conceived only as a set of rules entered into by nation-states to govern
their relationships with each other.  Moreover, these developments
have brought forth new academic energy, pushing international law
into fresh areas of conceptual inquiry.
Of course, this scholarly innovation is likely to proceed
regardless of the label.  Yet, sometimes a change in the overarching
theoretical framework can help to re-orient an emerging discourse,
accentuating important points of contact among scholars with
different disciplinary backgrounds and methodological commitments.
It is my hope, therefore, that the idea of law and globalization
                                                
266. See, e.g., Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Ties Military Aid to Peacekeepers Immunity, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 10, 2002, at A1 (reporting Bush administration warning that nations could lose
military assistance if they become members of the ICC without entering into a bilateral
agreement with the United States pledging that they will not deliver U.S. troops to the Hague
for prosecution by the ICC). See also Coalition For the International Criminal Court,
Factsheet: US Bilateral Immunity Agreements or So-Called “Article 98” Agreements,
available at http://www.iccnow.org/pressroom/factsheets/FS-BIAsAug2004. (last visited Jan.
21, 2005) (stating that, as of Aug. 1, 2004, over eighty countries had signed Bilateral
Immunity Agreements with the United States).
267. See, e.g., REISMAN, supra note 4, at xiii (noting that transnational decision
processes, like all law-making, have “an inevitable political dimension” in the sense that
participants “use their effective power . . . to secure the legal confirmation of arrangements
which they believe will discriminate in their favor,” but that, “as in all law-making, the
plurilateral or multilateral character of the process often reduces or contains the power of the
strongest actors and forces compromises”).
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encourages international law scholars to conceive of their work more
broadly and to engage in a dialogue with those working in related
fields both within law and elsewhere in academia.
Only such a comprehensive interdisciplinary approach will
allow us to conceptualize a world populated not only by states, but a
whole variety of normative communities.  Indeed, without a broader
conception of law that acknowledges non-sovereign (and even non-
governmental) articulations of norms, we are apt to ignore such
articulations altogether or deny them the status of law and thereby
miss the real force these norms have and the way in which they
interpenetrate official legal doctrine.  Rather than focusing solely on
the nation-state, therefore, the study of law and globalization may
help us to recognize that, in a world of permeable borders, multiple
affiliations, and overlapping interests, law is diffused in myriad ways,
and the construction of legal communities is always contested,
uncertain, and open to debate.
